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JUNE 1973/ONE DOLLAR

The CIA: Putting the Wisdom Back into Intelligence

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

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

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VOLUME FIVE NUMBER FOUR
JUNE 1973

Putting the Wisdom Back into Intelligence
by James Fallows
Figuring out what we don't want the CIA to do—give us another Bay of Pigs or provide disguises for Gordon Liddy—is easier than deciding what we do want it to do. Setting an agenda for the CIA requires deciding what we need to know about other countries, who should provide the information, and how they should go about getting it. 6

TIDBITS AND OUTRAGES 18

The Wall Street Lawyers in Washington
by Paul Hoffman
The legal careers of Roswell Gilpatric and Lawrence Walsh illustrate the higher-class version of influence peddling offered by the better New York firms. 20

Black and White Together Is Still the Point
by Walter Shapiro
From blue-collar precincts to Harvard Square, everyone seems to have given up on busing and school desegregation. Much of this reassessment is based on error—both intellectual and moral. 32

The Wife and Kids: Not the Excuse They Used to Be
by Michael Rappeport and Howard Van Lenten
As an increasing number of Americans acquire a cushion of capital—from real estate, and stocks to life insurance—fear of the breadline is no longer an adequate alibi for their timidity in confronting wrongdoing by the organizations for which they work. 43

Living Through the Boss—A Day in the Life of a Senator's A. A.
by Polly Toynbee
The Senator's "A. A.," his administrative assistant, is generally considered to be an important—even glamorous—figure in Washington. While typical days are as hard to find as typical A.A.s, this day and this man are reasonably close. 46

POLITICAL BOOK NOTES 61

LETTERS 4 **THE POLITICAL PUZZLE** 31 **MEMO OF THE MONTH** 45

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Letters

Life Insurance

Your series on the "Screwing of the Average Man" has become a journalistic classic, and certainly Chapter 5 on Life Insurance, by Urban Lehner, ["The Case for the Extended Family: Life Insurance," April], continues that tradition.

The reforms proposed for life insurance have implications for many other areas of consumer concern. For example, the Pennsylvania Insurance Department is beginning to propose readability standards for life insurance, as well as other kinds of policies. Based on a readability quotient developed by Rudolph Flesch, we are now rejecting policies, some of which are less readable than Einstein's basic work on relativity.

Why shouldn't readability standards apply to other documents faced by the consumer—leases, warranties, lending agreements, releases, and all the rest? A technology that puts a man on the moon ought to be able to produce consumer documents that can be read by the average man—who now gets screwed by a profusion of polysyllabic legalese.

The ultimate, perhaps, will be to subject politician's statements to readability standards. And while we're dreaming we might hook them up to lie detectors during press conferences.

HERBERT S. DENENBERG
Harrisburg, Pa.

Herbert Denenberg is Commissioner of Insurance for the State of Pennsylvania.

Disarmament

"Waiting for Disarmament," by C. Robert Zelnick [May], makes one very essential point: the military budget, like all other government budgets, should be subject to public scrutiny and debate. Department of Defense officials have too long shrouded the military budget in secrecy or presented it with patriotic phrases, hinting that those who oppose excessive military spending are somehow "unpatriotic."

No one would argue with the concept that America needs a strong system of defense. But within that general context, there is room—in fact, there is a great need—for discussion of some specific questions. How many missiles or how many bombers are the "right" number? How many are too many? How are those figures determined, and by whom?

The debate over military spending is more than a debate over funds. It is really a debate over priorities and over the direction in which the country should be moving. That debate is one in which the Congress and the public should be encouraged to take part freely. But to discuss the issue thoughtfully, we need statistics and facts that are presented clearly and forthrightly.

Articles like Mr. Zelnick's serve the public by making the military budget understandable. Popular understanding of the issues involved is our strongest weapon against excessive military spending.

MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON
Washington, D. C.

Michael Harrington is a U. S. Representative from Massachusetts.

Vietnam

Henry Fairlie's retrospective study of the press in the early nineteen-sixties ["We Knew What We Were Doing When We Went Into Vietnam," May] when the overwhelming volume of informed opinion clearly supported the irrevocable U. S. commitment to take possession of the war in South Vietnam, is a masterpiece of fact and reason.

The United States went, sequence by sequence, into the war in Vietnam in the face of a clear exposition of the facts and realities in pretty much the same manner that the American electorate, clearly exposed to the Nixon character and duplicity, chose him for the presidency in contradiction to preferable alternatives.

What I had not recently recalled until Fairlie did it for me was the conviction and certainty with which "the brightest and best" of our newspapers, journalists, and national spokesmen articulated at the time the position that the U. S. had no choice except the one it exercised: to escalate the war time and time again in order to *win* it. The conviction and certainty with which these same communications resources denounced the outcome of their previous positions, deceived me. Or perhaps a faltering memory did. In any case, Fairlie's architectural reconstruction of the information barrage laid down at the time is one of the more notable accomplishments of journalistic analysis I have seen in years.

WILLIAM RODGERS
Centreville, Md.

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The American Revolution is Being Brought to You By...

In celebration of our country's Bicentennial, corporate America and the White House are planning to sell you the American Revolution. Plastic liberty bells. Red, white, and blue Fords. Sarah Lee 1776 Birthday cakes.


For them, it wasn't a picnic.

But if they really understood the Revolution, they wouldn't be planning to push it so hard.

Two hundred years ago, this country was ruled by a repressive and unresponsive government which taxed the people, but served only the interests of a wealthy few.

The American Revolution was, above all, the overthrow of an entrenched establishment. The first American patriots risked their lives to realize the revolutionary idea that government ought to originate from, and serve the people. Make no mistake, theirs was a radical concept.

200 years later, the government they fought to establish will be teaming up with the corporations to spend a lot of money to convince us that nothing very radical happened back then. The Bicentennial planners will try to reduce the Revolution to a marketable style that reinforces their interest in a pacified America.

Who are the Tories of today? We think its rather clear.

The Peoples Bicentennial Commission is a non-profit group of non-sectarian people. We want to put the American Revolution back to work, and we think the time to do that is now. We're helping to plan a peoples campaign for the Bicentennial. A grass roots movement that can focus all of our energies into a force for decisive change in the 1970's.

So who are the Tories of today?

The Bicentennial is our chance to raise the same questions that people like Molly Pitcher and Tom Paine raised 200 years ago. They joined together and made history. We can do the same, and make the most exciting of times happen again.

We're asking you to join us. We'll send you a kit that can help you organize a Peoples Bicentennial in your community. It costs $7.00. Included are program suggestions and study guides, posters, pamphlets, buttons and our bimonthly newspaper which keeps you in touch with people doing the same thing in other parts of the country. Write to the Peoples Bicentennial Commission, Washington, D.C. 20036, or call 202/833-9121.


Seize and squeeze.

The second American Revolution. It's a big task, but not as big as taking on George III.

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Putting the Wisdom Back into Intelligence

by James Fallows

In recent years the "police brutality" style of thinking has become an increasingly prominent feature of liberal opinion in America. Several years back, when urban crime became big news, liberal politicians and intellectuals often found that their only palatable response was to point out that the police were doing wrong, and denounce them for it. Hence, police brutality. This was the right instinct, but it offered little solace to those who were genuinely panicked about being robbed or murdered. It also failed to ask the harder questions at the root of the problem—such as, what *should* the police be doing to ease people's fears, without trampling on others' rights? While the liberals were intellectually safe with their police brutality position, they left the political field open to those who offered quick answers to the popular outcry, answers like preventive detention and life sentences for drug dealers.

Much the same philosophy is evident in public reaction to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Over the past dozen years, the CIA has provided superabundant evidence for a police brutality approach to its problems. Operations like the Bay of Pigs invasion, the secret subsidies to universities and student groups, and the CIA-financed wars in Laos and the Congo understandably attracted public attention to what the agency should *not* be doing. These covert projects, usually referred to as "dirty tricks," are only a small part of the agency's official functions, but they have done more to shape America's image for the rest of the world than the State Department, Pepsi-Cola, Food for Peace, and Henry Kissinger combined.

Even so, a sense of sportsmanship makes it hard for us to passionately denounce these secret activities, since the case against them is so obvious. Perhaps the most persuasive argument against the "clandestine" projects is that they can be discussed in a



James Fallows is an editor of The Washington Monthly.

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low-security forum such as this magazine. One can hardly imagine James Bond or the men from KGB watching their exploits exposed in the press. It would be foolish to claim that every rock sheltering a secret operator has been turned over and every plan revealed, but the CIA's recent security record is not such as to do credit to allegedly undercover agents.

Since 1964, when David Wise and Thomas Ross published *The Invisible Government*, the trade in CIA exposes has been brisk. In 1966 *The New York Times* ran a five-part series which, among other offerings, explained how the CIA had poisoned 14,000 sacks of Cuban sugar that were in temporary storage in Puerto Rico. *Ramparts* told in 1967 about secret subsidies to the National Student Association. And more recent illustrations from Chile, Laos, Cambodia, and Washington, D. C. easily come to mind.

The bungled exploits have had their effect on our relations with both friend and foe. In the early sixties, a CIA agent recruiting local operators in Singapore attracted attention when he plugged in his lie detector and blew out all the lights at his hotel. He was arrested, and the British were infuriated to discover that we didn't trust their spies to provide us with all the news from the area. Then Washington offered Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew $3.3 million to keep



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quiet about the whole affair. Lee held out for 10 times as much, and eventually spilled the whole story to the press.

Even today, while the rest of us live and work as if we had a pretty good idea of what was happening in the world, lights are burning late in the CIA's Langley, Virginia headquarters, and agents are polishing up plans for the *next* big operation, the perfect one, the one that will avoid the mistakes made in Singapore and Cuba. Why do they persist? The answer reveals that the CIA is not as different from the Nebraska Department of Highways as both of them would like to think, since each is driven by institutional momentum to continue doing the same things it has always done in the past. In the CIA's case, the momentum comes from masses of old-time agents. These men were recruited in the days of Stalin, Truman, and Acheson; they were set on their chargers, equipped with lances, pointed in the enemy's direction, and given a shove. Most of them are still fighting; in fact so many are still with the agency that the then-director, James Schlesinger, had to sheepishly explain to Congress last month that the CIA has one of the government's worst aging problems.

One can sympathize with these older men, who, like railroad firemen and others whom time has passed by, are not sure what to make of the world they now face. They learned Swahili and Thai in the early days; they attended classes on how to crack a safe or bug an office; they devoted themselves to the struggle to grind out a few extra yards against the other team anywhere in the world. Now they are just trying to keep on doing the only things they know. In many ways, Howard Hunt, one of the convicted Watergate burglars, is the tragic archetype of their class. The tactics he used against the Democrats and Daniel Ellsberg might have come straight from an instruction manual on "How to Rig the Elections in Chad"; his demeanor since conviction suggests that he would behave the same way if he were captured by the Communist Chinese during a covert mission.

Sympathy for the agents' problems

The Intelligence Community

The CIA may be the most famous of the U. S. spy agencies, but it is hardly the largest or even the most influential. With its 15,000 employees and reported $750-million budget, the CIA is one of the smaller members of what is usually referred to as the "intelligence community." The largest representation is, not surprisingly, from the Pentagon. In 1961, Robert McNamara created the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as a step toward centralizing the intelligence networks of each of the armed forces. Today, the DIA is thriving, with a $100-million budget and 5,000 employees, but it has made no visible dent in the organizations it was designed to replace. According to figures compiled by Senator William Proxmire, Air Force intelligence employs 60,000 people and spends $2.8 billion; the Army has 38,500 intelligence employees and spends $775 million; and the Navy has 10,000 employees again at a cost of $775 million. The State Department has an Intelligence and Research branch (INR) which is relatively small (335 employees, $8-million budget) and concentrates on background research for State's policies. The National Security Agency, which describes its function as "code-breaking" but is the most secretive of all the organizations, employs 20,000 people and spends $1 billion. The "intelligence community" is rounded out by small representations from the Atomic Energy Commission, the FBI, and the Treasury Department. Altogether, the national intelligence systems employ 150,000 people and cost $6.2 billion annually.

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doesn't obscure the harmful by-products of their dirty tricks. The drawbacks of secret operations are numerous: they frequently don't work; they give the President "flexibility" in foreign policy when "restraint" is what we need; they reduce the State Department's representatives overseas to an undignified status, since the people of Lagos or Lima know what to conclude when the CIA station chief lives in a bigger house and has more agents working for him than the ambassador does; they make American diplomats fearful that the CIA will stage a coup as they are exchanging pleasantries with the soon-to-be-ousted government; they even confuse the CIA's own analysts, who are never sure whether the political developments they are charting are caused by genuine guerrillas or the CIA.

Even the agency's official spokesmen seem to be facing these sad facts. James Schlesinger had none of the super-spy aura of many previous CIA directors. Richard Helms, who headed the agency from 1966 until he was pensioned off as ambassador to Iran this spring, was an intelligence "professional"; he was a career spy, and as the CIA's Deputy Director of Plans, was in charge of covert activities. During the fifties, Director Allen Dulles had also stressed the agency's secret functions, and at times appeared to be running a clandestine arm of his brother's State Department.

What of Schlesinger? He is another of the "management men" much in evidence in government these days. Before coming to the CIA, Schlesinger served briefly as head of the Atomic Energy Commission, and before that had spent a short term in the Office of Management and Budget (where he conducted a study of the nation's intelligence system). Before coming into government, he had been an analyst at the RAND corporation. In leaks to the press between his appointment and his transfer to the Pentagon in early May, Schlesinger suggested that the new CIA would be different from the old in the same way that Schlesinger was different from Helms—less razzle-dazzle, secrecy, and drama; more pipe-smoking and analysis. In his three months at the agency, Schlesinger encouraged more than 1,000 agents, mainly from the "operations" branches, to retire. Of course, reports of scaled-down "operations" cannot be taken at face value, not least because Schlesinger's successor as Director, William Colby, was promoted from the operations division, where he headed such projects as the "Phoenix" campaign of political terror in Vietnam. But times clearly are changing.

Still, neither criticizing the clandestine activities nor retiring the secret operators takes us far toward figuring out what really should be done with the CIA. If keeping it from doing dirty tricks were the only issue, the simplest solution would be to close down the whole agency. There is something besides secret missions at stake, and though it may seem obvious, the real issue is the importance of the "intelligence" function.

Intelligence is usually defined as "evaluated information," and is subclassified by the pros into categories ranging from "current intelligence" (up-to-the-minute bulletins) to "national intelligence estimates" (weighty analyses of long-term trends). The justification for having an intelligence system at all is that the government needs reliable information on which to base decisions. The CIA's specific intelligence role is to tell the truth about what is happening overseas.

Just how much truth we need to know, and about what, are the questions we must answer in setting priorities for the intelligence agencies. Before attempting that, it is worth noting that the CIA is unique in its truth-telling role. What sets it apart from other government organizations that send dispatches from abroad (see box) is its agents' detachment from policy-making. A Foreign Service Officer may be reluctant to point out that his embassy's policies are failing;

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an Air Force reconnaissance officer may doctor his evidence to fit his general's plans; but CIA agents are relatively free of these personal and institutional pressures. "Basically, you need someone who doesn't give a damn whether a program succeeds or fails," says Chester Cooper, a former CIA agent and author of *The Lost Crusade*. "He's the only one who will tell you where things are going wrong."

The contrast between the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) illustrates the virtues of detachment—known in the trade as "having no ax to grind." The best of the recent books on intelligence problems, Patrick McGarvey's *CIA, The Myth and the Madness*, explains why the DIA is congenitally incapable of telling the truth. Until very recently, few of its officers were intelligence specialists; most were career soldiers serving a brief stretch between assignments in Vietnam and Europe. Many were more interested in coming out of their DIA assignment with a good personnel rating than in challenging what looked like dubious intelligence estimates. This quite predictably reduced not only their skill as analysts, but also their objectivity.

The resulting bias was displayed to the public in 1969, during the ABM debate in Congress. Armed with DIA estimates of Russian intentions, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird told his audience some spine-chilling tales. The Russians were planning to build 500 big SS-9 missiles, he said; and "new evidence" indicated that they were also on their way to creating a "first-strike capability" designed to annihilate the U. S. in a nuclear war. The most charitable explanation for these figures is that they came from the DIA's "worst-case" method of estimation. This line of reasoning, similar to the "what-if-I-die-tomorrow" thoughts that race through the brain at bedtime, starts with basic technical data on Russian capabilities. Then the DIA analysts compute what the enemy could do if he poured all his effort into building missiles—the worst case. This pessimistic approach is healthy for generals contemplating battle or investors entering the stock market, but in predicting Russian missile strength, it leads to dramatic exaggerations. The "errors" are presumably tolerable to the Pentagon, since they support its argument for more missiles to counter the threat.

In the case of the ABM, Laird might well have stampeded the Senate into approving the project were it not for CIA reports. Richard Helms revealed that his agency's analyses showed that the Russians would end up with 300-odd missiles rather than the 500 DIA predicted (they eventually built 318); that work on ABM sites near Moscow had virtually ceased; and that the "new evidence" of a first-strike capability was at best tenuous.

In fairness, it is worth mentioning that the CIA has not wholly digested the lessons of the ABM debate. The interconnection between its intelligence gathering and its clandestine operations is a classic illustration of tendencies it criticizes in the DIA and other agencies. In planning escapades like the Bay of Pigs, the CIA violates its own fundamental rule about detached analysis, because the agents *do* have a stake in the information they analyze. Undercover operators are put in the position of generating data

Answers to May Political Puzzle:

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to justify the projects they want to carry out. They report that "Yes, the Cubans will rise to join us," or "No, we won't get caught if we stage a coup." Allen Dulles wrote, "Policymakers tend to become wedded to the policy for which they are responsible. State and Defense employees are no exception to this very human tendency." Neither are CIA agents.

When they play their proper, detached role, CIA analysts are one step nearer objectivity than Foreign Service Officers and military men. And they have other advantages as well. Many of them are semi-academics (one third have Ph.D.s), whose professional advancement depends more on their expertise in the affairs of, say, Ecuador, than on their skill in massaging the ego of the ambassador or general above them. Compared to men in the other agencies, the CIA men have *time* to reflect on their judgments, to read books, to base their reaction on something other than the latest dispatch from the field.

To gauge the importance of the truth-telling function, one need only imagine what the government's domestic programs might be like if there were an internal CIA looking them over. The purpose of many programs becomes subverted somewhere in the pipeline between the Washington headquarters and the local office that actually constructs the public housing or operates the Head Start program. But because reports on the problems of these programs have to ascend the very chain of command that caused the problems in the first place, those at the top are generally sheltered from the worst news from the field.

LBJ on Cows and Intelligence

Because of its detachment, the CIA is one of the few groups that can look back on the Vietnam war as a relatively bright spot in its history. Chester Cooper has noted the contrasts between CIA reports on the war and the rosier views coming in from the State Department and the military. As early as 1964, the CIA was questioning the domino theory, saying that "with the possible exception of Cambodia, it is likely that no nation in the area would quickly succumb to Communism as a result of the fall of Laos and Vietnam." Later the agency doubted that raining bombs onto North Vietnam would reduce either the material or the psychological support for the war, and throughout the sixties the CIA reports on the popularity of South Vietnam's assorted leaders were more accurate than those of the Pentagon. As further proof that outsiders can get a clearer view of a problem than those causing it, the CIA's reports on the village-pacification program became sharply more critical in 1965. This, it turns out, was when the Army finally wrested control of the program from CIA operatives.

The role of detached critic does, of course, come at a price, the same price that journalists pay for their privilege of criticizing and complaining. Be-

Watergate burglar James McCord recently alleged that the White House wanted the whole bugging operation blamed on the CIA. He also expressed his more general concern about the way President Nixon was treating the agency:

> It appeared to me that the White House had for some time been trying to get political control over the CIA assessments and estimates in order to make them conform to "White House policy." This could mean that CIA estimates could then be forced to accord with DOD estimates of future U. S. weapons and hardware needs. . . . This smacked of the situation which Hitler's intelligence chiefs found themselves in, when they were put in the position of having to tell him what they thought he wanted to hear. . . instead of what they really believed. . . . When linked with what I saw happening to the FBI under Pat Gray. . . it appeared that the two government agencies which should be able to prepare their reports . . . with complete integrity and honesty . . . were no longer going to be able to do so.

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cause bad news is rarely popular with kings, presidents, or administrators, the bearer of bad tidings often loses his influence to those with more reassuring reports. Lyndon Johnson—who, in *The Vantage Point*, does not mention a single CIA estimate in describing his Vietnam decisions—expressed his appreciation for the agency's pessimistic reports this way:

> Policy-making is like milking a fat cow. You see the milk coming out, you press more, and the milk bubbles and flows. And just as the bucket is full, the cow whips its tail around the bucket and everything is spilled. That's what the CIA does to policy-making.

In the early days of the Nixon Administration, the truth-tellers in the CIA had reason to fear that they would get an even less-sympathetic hearing than before (see box, page11). Henry Kissinger was hardly overwhelmed by the CIA's insight. After reading a few reports on Vietnam and returning one CIA report with "piece of crap" scrawled across the cover, Kissinger did not take another CIA estimate seriously in setting his Vietnam policy. But instead of consulting inner oracles or getting reassurance from the generals, as Bundy and Rostow and Rusk had done, Kissinger created his own intelligence agency within the National Security Council staff. His researchers produced more than a hundred "National Security Study Memoranda" during Nixon's first term, papers which laid out all the options and arguments in the style Nixon liked. From most accounts, these reports have done the job that CIA estimates once did.

Even more important than the location of the intelligence system is its focus. How much do we need to know, and about what? Unless we make the priorities clear, we cannot expect the CIA to automatically divine what kind of information will be most important in the coming years. Given the normal laws of bureaucratic behavior, the agency will report in the future the same things it has reported in the past. In many cases the old things are the wrong things to ask now, and new intelligence needs have arisen. In order to set a realistic intelligence policy, there are three questions to be answered. First, what do we need to know? Second, who should provide the information? Third, how should they get it?

Embarrassing Moments for the CIA

One approach to the first question is to consider some of the widely recognized "intelligence failures" of recent years. A decade ago, the most prominent items on this list might have been the surprise construction of the Berlin Wall, or the delay in detecting the Soviet missiles in Cuba. During the Nixon Administration, there have been seven major occasions on which the intelligence establishment has felt embarrassed by its performance.

- The overthrow of Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia—although Sihanouk blames this on the CIA (his recent book is called *My War With the CIA*), the coup startled the Administration because, at the Senate's insistence, American agents had been pulled out of the country.
- The Son Tay prison raid—the rescuers found that the American POWs they came to save had been moved elsewhere.
- South Vietnam's invasion of Laos—intelligence reports predicted a large Communist force in the vicinity, but the military never got the message.
- The invasion of Cambodia in 1970—in one of the CIA's worst performances, its agents miscalculated the strategic importance of the port of Sihanoukville.
- The Allende election in Chile, which analysts had not expected.
- The 1969 coup in Libya, another surprise.
- Aerial reconnaissance before the Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire, which misjudged the extent of Soviet rocketry.

The most interesting aspect of this

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list is what it says about the CIA's view of crisis-oriented thinking and foreign policy. What caused these "failures"? Either defective military planning (the need for which could be reduced by avoiding similar wars), or an inability to predict the headlines three weeks in advance. There are good reasons for thinking that we shouldn't try so hard to keep ahead of the breaking news. For one thing, there are limits to how good this kind of intelligence can be; the four illustrations from the Vietnam war suggest the enormous difficulty of installing spies among a people totally different from us in race and culture and overwhelmingly hostile. We are likely to crack the KGB before we get a good agent in Hanoi. Also, current intelligence comes at a sharply rising marginal cost. By reading the newspapers and monitoring the diplomatic reports, we may be 90 percent sure of when a certain government is about to be overthrown. The extra effort required for 95-percent certainty—which usually means spying, bribery, double agents, and informers—is so costly and provocative that it rarely seems worthwhile. But this is just what the CIA feels it has been trained to do. It is also simpler to slip more spies into an area than to think seriously about long-range developments. So the agency often embarks on a mad pursuit of current news bulletins.

If we step away from this fascination with current intelligence for a moment, the incidents of "intelligence failure" seem limited and trivial, compared with some of our failures to perceive more gradual developments. Another list of failures might be headed by our delay in recognizing that the Sino-Soviet split was opening the door to China, or our slow perception of the dollar's plight overseas, or the apparently unforeseen diplomatic damage done in Europe and Japan by the Nixon-Connally economic manifestos of 1971. In the coming years, developments like these will affect our national interest far more directly than distant coups or Latin American elections. The CIA can still keep track of the coups, but it should also start directing its attention elsewhere.

What follows is a list of the subjects about which we'll need reliable intelligence in the next few years. In each situation the questions to answer are *what* do we need to know, *who* should provide the information, and *how* should they get it?

Strategic Intelligence from Russia and China

Until disarmament is achieved, we will need to know about the missiles, nuclear bombs, and submarines of the Russians and Chinese. We may conceivably ignore other world events, but this is one development undeniably related to our national security. Good strategic intelligence should not be important only to the Strangeloves—accurate estimates of the other side's weaponry is one of the prerequisites to continued peace and stability. Both sides need to know that the other's deterrent force is large and functioning. If we care about disarmament, we also need accurate intelligence. Negotiators at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks found that each side's satellite intelligence systems—which guaranteed that neither we nor the Russians could cheat on an agreement—were one of the strongest incentives toward serious bargaining. Finally, accurate intelligence reports can help us control the defense budget, as the ABM showdown illustrated.

How do we get this information? At one time we had to rely on secret agents who tried to sneak into Soviet defense installations. With the U-2 incident in 1960, the public was first informed of the shift from spies to aerial reconnaissance. Since then, in a rare example of technology's being the friend of man, advances in reconnaissance techniques have not only made the reports far more accurate, but also made our means of obtaining them far less obtrusive. The electronic

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and photographic satellites that survey Russia and China can photograph objects 18 inches long and detect the changing of tubes at a Russian radar station. The satellite techniques are expensive—they account for the huge Air Force intelligence budget—but they are certainly the least provocative and probably the most effective way of finding out what we need to know.

Once we have the satellites, do we need anything else? A former CIA agent who helped prepare estimates of Russia's strategic strength in the sixties and who worked on Helms' ABM report says that he and his colleagues relied on two main sources: technical evidence, collected by the satellites and deductive evidence, such as estimates from American rocket experts of how long it would take the Russians to build systems similar to ours. The agent said, "You start with the press reports and the information from normal diplomatic channels; that makes up about 50 per cent of the information you use. Another 45 per cent is from the technical reports and the experts you consult here. About two or three per cent is your own analysis. The rest—the spies and the secret hocus-pocus—is usually worthless."

Managing the technical intelligence gives the CIA, the DIA, and the Air Force something to do; the Air Force and the DIA maintain the satellites and reconnaissance planes and the CIA analyzes the information. That leaves us with the Army and Navy intelligence systems and very little to assign them to. These intelligence systems have one justifiable function, which is to prepare "order of battle" reports on enemy troops. These are rather straightforward accounts of how many men and tanks are lined up where. The Army and Navy are not always content with this prosaic task and often try to expand their intelligence role. The capture of the *Pueblo* off the coast of North Korea was one of the consequences of this restlessness. The *Pueblo*'s mission was to locate North Korean radar stations—something the satellites could have done with no risk of provocation. As a general rule, when it's possible to find out by satellite, the military should stay away. One means of enforcing this policy would be to disband the Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence systems and concentrate their few essential functions in a smaller DIA.

Political Intelligence from Russia and China

The Pentagon's performance in the ABM debate is an example of what technical intelligence can do when it is divorced from political common sense. To realistically interpret photographs of missile sites, we need to know whether the Kremlin is going to stress weapons or refrigerators in next year's budget. A shortage of good political intelligence was also largely responsible for the general fear of China which prevailed here until so recently. After the Korean War, in which the Chinese made what we considered an irrational attack, our government could not shake the conviction that Mao's disciplined hordes would take other unpredictable steps. Who could tell whether the Cultural Revolution would lead to an invasion of Russia or an attack on Taiwan or Japan? The current, almost cloying, wave of Sinophilia illustrates the relief many of us feel in substituting panda bears for armed Red Guards as a symbol of China.

The Chinese example also tells a lot about how we should collect political information. China was diplomatically and culturally closed to us during the fifties and sixties, but the CIA was theoretically free to slip in as many spies as it could. Not many got through, and the lesson may be that diplomatic contact is more important than it often appears to be. In an age of hot lines and world-wide TV, it is easy, and fairly accurate, to conclude that the Foreign Service is a decorative appendage; but one of the main

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reasons for the diplomats' decline is that their main function—taking the political pulse of a country—has been usurped by the CIA. There is scant evidence that the CIA's political reporting is always superior to that of the Foreign Service—the memoirs of ambassadors such as George Kennan and Charles Bohlen show that they were among the most sensitive to shifts within the Kremlin. When the CIA tries to horn in, it not only creates unnecessary suspicion, but also further undermines an already demoralized Foreign Service.

Our concern for the Foreign Service shouldn't be pushed too far. As the Vietnam war record indicates, there is value in having competing information sources reporting from the field. Checking the quality of FSO's reports would be an ideal assignment for the CIA. But in most cases, the agency could do the job with annual visits to the diplomatic outposts, rather than setting up oversized CIA stations all over the globe.

Political Intelligence from the Rest of the World

When the focus moves away from Russia and China, the question of what we need to know becomes more and more tangled with the question of what our world role should be. One way to separate the issues may be to examine each area of the globe and ask what kinds of developments are clearly of concern to us.

We start with Western Europe and Japan. Here the political intelligence from diplomatic, academic, and journalistic sources is overwhelming. As for military intelligence, if we cannot trust these countries to tell us what they are planning, it hardly makes sense to share our nuclear secrets with them or join them in NATO or other defense pacts.

That leaves Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the other disparate regions usually classified as the Third World. These continents, and especially South America, have traditionally suffered the most from close CIA scrutiny. The harvest from these activities is not only the agency's affiliation with many repressive regimes, but also the astounding paranoia about the CIA which prevails abroad. Within the last 18 months, headlines have appeared in Iraq, Egypt, India, and four Latin American countries attributing domestic unrest to the CIA.

The two standard justifications for Third-World intelligence are, first, the threat of communist subversion, either military or political; and second, the danger of wars, coups, and other violent outbursts. Detecting the first threat, if it exists, does not require large contingents of secret agents. It is hard to believe that no one among our diplomats, satellites, and even tourists would notice the arrival of foreign troops in a small country. If the "subversion" is political, then it is probably wise to know no more about it than the diplomats can observe; if we know when the coup is going to happen, we may be tempted to prevent it.

The CIA's efforts have backfired in another way. During the 1960s, some perceptive Southerners complained that the only thing keeping the Ku Klux Klan alive was the FBI informers. Similarly, by trying to infiltrate every left-wing movement in Latin America, the CIA has inadvertently nurtured threats that otherwise would have withered on their own.

The second justification—the danger of war—should be taken more seriously. Even if we do not plan to rush into regional wars with quite the alacrity we have displayed in the past, disturbances of the peace anywhere in the world concern us. There is always the danger that a battle in the Middle East, or between India and Pakistan, will somehow draw other powers into the fray. More basically, if we want to encourage a more peaceful world, we should understand why people fight. A lack of this cultural understanding is the weakness of much of our

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Third-World reporting. So much stress is placed on palace gossip that the larger picture is often obscured.

During the 1971 India-Pakistan war, the CIA made a splash in the National Security Council with a dispatch showing that India planned to take over the whole of Pakistan. The information (which later proved distorted) came from an informer in the Indian cabinet. It was a triumph of the old-style espionage, but wrong. What the CIA should have been looking for were the long-range causes of the fighting. What had set the Hindus and Moslems at each others' throats? Were they likely to fight again? Most of the recent warfare in the Third World has risen not from narrowly political or ideological causes, but from religious, cultural, and tribal tensions: consider Biafra, Uganda, Pakistan, the Middle East, and the "demographic war" between Honduras and El Salvador. So trying to understand the violence by sifting through embassy rumors is doomed from the start. Looking for the roots of violence would not require the contingent of spies and saboteurs we now deploy in the Third World; instead, the raw material for such reflection would be academic and diplomatic observation, and the conclusions would come from thoughtful analysis rather than spying.

In discussing this point, Adam Yarmolinsky, one of Robert McNamara's advisers at the Pentagon, said to me, "My gut feeling is that if I have a chance to know, I want to know. If knowing involves risks, I'll face them later. That is preferable to the risk of not knowing." Perhaps, but why not minimize the risk by concentrating on the issues that matter and cutting back the purely political espionage?

"You need to know what they're doing to each other under the table," Samuel Adams, an outspoken CIA agent said, in justifying the need for clandestine operations. "In a country like Uganda, if you just read the papers you won't have a clue as to what is going on." If Amin and Uganda were a perfect analogue to Hitler and Germany, the point would be valid. But we must ask two questions about cases like Amin's. First, is what's going on under the table of concern to us? In Uganda, the immediate answer is no. In Israel, or Egypt, or South Africa, or Pakistan, the answer may be yes; these are countries with the potential to involve many other countries in their fighting. This list will expand if nuclear weapons are more widely distributed. Second, are spies the only way to find out about the sub rosa activities? Our diplomats in Uganda won't just be reading the papers, and their idea of what's really going on should be accurate enough to meet our needs.

Counter-Espionage

Counter-espionage means protecting your country's secrets from the other country's spies. It usually involves such ploys as infiltrating the opposition's intelligence system. From all reports, the CIA has not done well in penetrating the KGB. But as long as there is any data we should withhold from the Russians, the effort is worthwhile. There is at least one piece of information that fits this category: the technical details and deployment plans for our Polaris submarine fleet. The Polaris is the heart of our deterrent system, and it is too easy to imagine that in some Pentagon office there is a board showing where the subs are at any given moment. Prudence suggests that we should at least keep that room off-limits for KGB agents and have a way of knowing when they have seen the plans.

Another kind of counter-espionage is less necessary. CIA agents are constantly guarding against communist subversion at such vital links in our military defenses as the Kagnew military base in Ethiopia. It is altogether too easy to imagine that somewhere there is an American military base of no strategic importance, whose only function is to employ CIA agents to prevent it from being spied

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on. A simpler solution might be to take the base away.

Terrorism

If there is one effort in which the world's intelligence systems can cooperate rather than compete, it is in preventing terrorism. Even those who sympathize with many of the grievances of the Irish Republican Army or the Black September group find it hard to stomach their violent excesses. In combatting terrorists, the CIA has a rare chance to put its secret tactics and dirty tricks to good use. Already the agency has begun work in this area. After the Black September killings at the Munich Olympic Games, a "Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism" was created in the State Department. The CIA feeds reports to the Committee, which in turn dispatches warnings to U. S. diplomats abroad.

Economic Intelligence

If we look for the international forces that are actually going to affect the way we live in the next decade and forget for the moment about an abstract threat from Uganda, we must confront the dramatic changes in the world economy which have become increasingly apparent in the last few years. This does not mean expanding the data on Russian beet and steel production that the CIA has been collecting for years. Instead, it means realizing that we—like the British since World War II—will soon be in the position of living fat or lean as international economic laws dictate. Changes now occurring in Japan and Western Europe may affect our unemployment level more than anything done by the Council of Economic Advisers. Resource and environmental questions are involved as well. How will competing for the same flow of Arabian oil affect our already tepid relations with Japan? What will we do if the Arabs decide they don't need to sell us any more oil? The Chileans may claim all the fish 500 miles out to sea as theirs; or the African countries may affiliate more tightly with the Common Market; these and a hundred similar developments will affect us in an immediate, material fashion.

Just because economic changes are not secret, there is a tendency not to take them as seriously as missiles or subversive movements. But they are the most difficult challenge the CIA's analysts will face in the coming years. In the last two decades the agency has had to shift focus. For example, when communist activity died down in Africa, agents put their techniques to use in Southeast Asia. In general, it has been a question since 1947 of applying similar tactics to different parts of the globe. Now it is a question of applying entirely new theories and ideas. The information itself is easy to come by; it is available in economic reports and academic studies. Changing the outlook is harder, but it is what the CIA should be doing. ■

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Tidbits and Outrages

The Future Is Now

A diligent *San Francisco Chronicle* correspondent found the following in the revised state code of the Division of Consumer Services Department of Consumer Affairs:

Tenses, Gender, and Number: For the purpose of the rules and regulations contained in this chapter, the present tense includes the past and future tenses, and the future, the present; the masculine gender includes the feminine, and the feminine, the masculine; and the singular includes the plural, and the plural the singular.

Strange Bedfellows

A constant theme of *The Washington Monthly* has been that one of the principal roots of national evil has been people's pervasive fear of losing the phony jobs they hold in the great corporate and government bureaucracies. That our efforts are not as successful as we might wish is indicated by a recent Gallup poll which shows that the number of persons opposed to the idea of a federal law banning featherbedding has risen by 40 per cent since 1962.

Capitalized Capitol

We have often observed that many of the failures of government spring from the gap that separates the responsible bureaucrat in Washington from the problems out there in the country with which he and his bureacratic unit are supposed to be dealing. We are indebted to the Washington *Star-News* for more facts that help explain the gap:

The higher the grade level of a federal employee, the more likely it is that he works in Washington. As of 1971, about 11 per cent of all GS-4 employees and 13 per cent of the GS-9 employees worked in Washington. But Washington accounts for 27 per cent of the nation's GS-13 workers, 60 per cent of the GS-15 workers, and so on up the scale.

Plumbing Comes to Louisiana

From our old friend, the *Commerce Business Daily*, a list of U. S. government procurement invitations and contract awards:

+Y–CONSTRUCTION OF LUSH TOILETS AND BATH HOUSES at Caney Lake Recreation Area–Project site located at Caney Lake approximately 5 miles north of Minden, LA via LA hwy 159, Webster Parish, LA–IFB R8-6-72-40–Bid Opening 5 Jun 72. The estimated price range for work to be contracted is $85,000 - $135,000. Bid documents and specifications will be furnished prospective bidders upon written request. (P133)
U. S. Forest Service, 2500 Shreveport Highway
Pineville, LA 71360

Bring Back the Seabees

Ralph Nader recently noted that Japan's Nissan Motor Company had designed a 2,200-pound production model car (with air bag) which could take a 50-mph frontal barrier crash and permit its occupants to survive. A 50-mph crash into a fixed barrier is equivalent to a car crashing into a similar standing car at 100 mph. Crashes occurring at this speed or less are responsible for 90 per cent of all traffic fatalities. As was the case of Honda's superior pollution control system, Nissan has moved ahead of the giant U. S. auto companies who said it couldn't be done.

Russell Baker commented:

What a falling off is this. We hear it and think of the Seabees in World War II. The difficult they did immediately. Remember? The impossible took a little longer.

There were can-do guys in those days, and there used to be can-do guys in Detroit, too. America was full of can-do guys not so long ago.

Nowadays we have can't-do guys. Washington is perpetually filled with them, all looking for a government handout, or a backdoor appointment at the Justice Department, all leaning on the Congress and Pentagon and White House while their superb lobbying machines boast that they can't build an airplane, can't fulfill a contract, can't run a railroad, can't stop dumping their garbage in their own life's air.

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

The Illustrated Bureaucrat

We're sure many of our readers who have dealt with government have wondered exactly what is inside the bureaucrat's brain. The answer is provided by this illustration from a *Civil Service Journal* (Jan.-March, 1973) article entitled "The Developing Role of Career Managers."

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The Wall Street Lawyers in Washington

by Paul Hoffman

There are big firms and small firms; Republican firms and Democratic firms; Jewish firms and gentile firms; "white-shoe" firms and "law factories": some trace their antecedents back to the 1790s. Let's start with Cravath, Swaine & Moore. It's not the biggest. With two hundred lawyers Shearman & Sterling is New York's largest law firm. It's not the oldest. Lord, Day & Lord was formed in 1845 and has retained the same name since. Nor is it necessarily the best. It's a subjective judgment, to be sure, but most New York lawyers rate Sullivan & Cromwell as No. 1. But Cravath is a model of how a Wall Street firm is organized and how it operates.

Seventy years ago, when law firms were casual collections of individual practitioners who combined for their mutual benefit and just as casually fell out again, Cravath deliberately set out to institutionalize itself, to create an entity that would transcend and outlive the influence of any one or two partners. The origins of the present Cravath, Swaine & Moore can be traced back to 1819, but the processes of institutionalization did not begin until 1906, when Paul D. Cravath took command of what was then Cravath, Henderson & deGersdorff.

A crusty, terrible-tempered tyrant, Cravath, according to the firm history written by his successor, Robert T. Swaine, "had a definite philosophy about the organization of his law firm".

First, like a symphony orchestra, it should be tyrannical; one man would call the tune and set the tempo.

Second, the firm would prosper not on *who* it knew, but on *what* it knew; it would live by merit, not by political pull. Within the firm merit would be the only qualification; lawyers would be hired and promoted on

This article is adapted from Lions in the Street, *by Paul Hoffman, to be published this month by Saturday Review Press.*

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the basis of their legal acumen, not on their ability to bring in business. To insure enforcement of this standard, there would be no nepotism, no hiring of partners' sons, nephews, and in-laws.

Third, "the practice of law must be the primary interest and that practice shall be solely as a member of the Cravath team." This would mean no sideline practice, no dabbling in business, and it would pretty well preclude politics or public service. To prevent possible conflicts of interest, Cravath lawyers would not only be barred from serving on the boards of directors of client corporations, but from owning stock in them as well.

Fourth, members of the firm would be promoted through the ranks. Partners would not be brought in from the outside; instead, the cream of Ivy League law school graduates would be hired as "law clerks" (now called "associates"), paid salary—a startling innovation at the turn of the century—indoctrinated in Cravath's methods, and groomed for leadership. "At the outset of their practice," said Swaine, "Cravath men are not thrown into the deep water and told to swim; rather they are taken into shallow water and taught strokes."

As other firms grew in size and found themselves—almost without asking for it—becoming institutions, they copied the Cravath system, especially its method of recruitment and promotion, now universal throughout the blue-chip bar.

The Cravath system tended to produce an able and hard-working, if narrow and unimaginative, lawyer—what law students call a "grind." Cravath himself wanted it that way. "Brilliant intellectual powers are not essential," he told a Harvard Law class in 1920. "Too much imagination, too much wit, too great cleverness, too facile fluency, if not leavened by a sound sense of proportion, are quite

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as likely to impede success as to promote it. The best clients are apt to be afraid of those qualities. They want as their counsel a man who is primarily honest, safe, sound, and steady."

Cravath has always been wary of the man who came on too fast, who posed a threat to the established order. It is significant that—until recent years—no one who remained with the firm distinguished himself outside it.

An End to Isolationism

The current presiding partner is Roswell Gilpatric. His ascension to power symbolizes the most significant change at Cravath—the end of its policy of isolation. He has left the firm twice for government service—as Undersecretary of the Air Force in the Truman Administration, where he proved "a wizard at forestalling bottlenecks in aircraft production"; and as Deputy Defense Secretary under John F. Kennedy. Unlike John McCloy, who had left the firm following disagreements over his government service in the forties, Gilpatric returned each time with enhanced stature, and, according to critics, each time with a major defense contractor in tow as a Cravath client.

His tenure at Defense sparked one of those controversies to which Cravath seems peculiarly prone. As Deputy Secretary, Gilpatric played a key role in pushing through the $6.5-billion contract to General Dynamics for construction of the ill-fated TFX jet fighter. General Dynamics was a Cravath client; it paid the firm more than $300,000 in fees between 1958 and 1963. Gilpatric himself had an office in General Dynamics' headquarters in Rockefeller Center and had advised the company on one of its acquisitions. After the TFX award, Cravath switched from being *a* counsel for General Dynamics to being *the* counsel.

After a lengthy inquiry, the Senate

Permanent Investigations subcommittee—over the protests of its chairman, Arkansas Democrat John McClellan, and Washington's Henry "Scoop" Jackson, "the Senator from Boeing"—gave Gilpatric a 5-to-4 vote of confidence. And the Justice Department absolved him of any "legal or ethical conflict of interest." But seven years later, another Senate committee that looked into the contract concluded:

> Deputy Secretary Roswell Gilpatric was guilty of a flagrant conflict of interest in the TFX award.... The record makes clear the fact that he was a top-level policy counselor to General Dynamics for the two and one-half years immediately before his appointment and that he was a de facto member of the company's board of directors. The record shows that he participated in the TFX award proceedings and that he advised Secretary McNamara to give the contract to General Dynamics.... He obviously should have disqualified himself from taking any part in the decision.

Cravath's emergence from isolation also saw its partners taking a more

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active role in its clients' business affairs. Gilpatric sits on the boards of CBS, Corning Glass, Fairchild Camera, and Eastern Airlines (not a Cravath client—yet), as well as the Federal Reserve Bank; other senior partners serve on the boards of Time-Life, Chemical Bank, General Dynamics, and IBM.

Gilpatric insists it wasn't a change in policy, only "an expansion of exceptions" to the old rule. Yet he harbors Paul Cravath's old misgivings about the practice: "I think there's a conflict of interest when you're acting both as counsel and as a member of the board." It's a conflict Cravath has yet to resolve.

A Wall Street lawyer's public service can also benefit his clients. Consider the career of Lawrence E. Walsh, a senior partner of Davis, Polk & Wardwell. "Judge" to acquaintances, "Ed" to friends, Walsh is a thin, wiry man, a self-professed "square." He was born in Canada, raised in Queens, educated at Columbia and Columbia Law. He started in the New York state district attorney's office under Thomas Dewey, and much of his success can be traced to friendships he forged there.

After a few months as an associate at Davis, Polk, Walsh followed Dewey to Albany in 1943, and for the next decade held a variety of state jobs—assistant counsel and counsel to Dewey, counsel to the Public Service Commission, and first director of the Waterfront Commission.

In 1954, with Dewey leaving office, Walsh was named to the federal bench. Though he served only three years, he still retains the title "Judge." He resigned in 1957 when William G. Rogers, a colleague from the Dewey days in the district attorney's office, was appointed U. S. Attorney General and brought Walsh to Washington as the Justice Department's Number Two man.

In 1961, Walsh returned to Davis, Polk—this time as a full-fledged partner. But few lawyers in New York remained as busy with extracurricular activities. He quickly developed what one lawyer termed "a reputation for knowing and doing exactly what was expected of him." In the wake of the State Liquor Authority scandal, Governor Rockefeller named Walsh to head a panel to recommend revisions in the alcoholic beverage laws. Mayor Lindsay chose Walsh to head a commission to study the Police Department; the commission eventually recommended adoption of the ill-fated civilian review board. The state's chief judge, Stanley Fuld—another colleague from the district attorney's office—picked him as special prosecutor in the impeachment of a tainted judge.

Walsh's outside activities picked up after Nixon's election. His old friend Rogers became Secretary of State and appointed Walsh to assist Henry Cabot Lodge at the Paris peace talks. At the same time, Walsh was chosen to head the American Bar Association's (ABA) committee on the federal judiciary. In

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this post, he passed on all of Nixon's judicial nominations. It brought him into almost daily contact with his successor as Deputy Attorney General, Richard Kleindienst—an interesting assignment for a lawyer who defined his area of specialization at Davis, Polk as "any matter relating with the Department of Justice once it got above the routine level."

Walsh estimates that the ABA assignment takes up more than a third of his time—about 700 hours a year. "If I work 1800 hours, that makes up for it," he says. "I get about 1,000 billable hours a year. Mr. Davis' idea of public service was that each person is expected to give 10 per cent of his time to public service. I make up for those who don't."

Walsh's ABA assignment has also brought him into the cockpit of political controversy, for his panel approved Nixon's nominations of both Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell for the Supreme Court. Although Walsh admits that his approval of Carswell "disappointed a number of my friends," he continued to defend his action long after the Senate rejected the nominee.

"There is a defense of Carswell," he says, "but I'm tired of stating it." But he stated it often enough to earn some due bills from the Administration. He wasn't long in cashing them.

In 1969, Whitney North Seymour, Jr. became U. S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. As his executive assistant he named John M. Burns, III. Although a Democrat, Burns had a long association with Seymour, having managed his successful campaign for the state senate and his losing race for Congress, as well as having served as Seymour's legislative aide in Albany.

In the U. S. Attorney's office, Burns soon staked out his area of specialization—water pollution. Using a little-enforced provision of the Refuse Act of 1899, he racked up a startling record—a $5,000 fine against Consolidated Edison; a $25,000 fine against Transit Mix Corporation; another $25,000 fine against Kay Fries Chemicals. Soon the figures started escalating. Washburn Wire Company was fined $125,000 for polluting the Harlem River, though the penalty was suspended pending a clean-up. Standard Brands was fined $215,000 for polluting the Hudson—and this time the penalty stuck.

Then, in October, 1970, Burns took on General Motors, accusing the auto company of dumping toxic wastes into the Hudson from its Chevrolet plant in Tarrytown.

GM does not retain any one law firm as its general counsel. It hires attorneys as the occasion demands. When it had to deal with John Mitchell's Justice Department, it showed up with Lawrence Walsh of Davis, Polk. Walsh had represented GM only once previously—on the legal aspects of GM's 1970 annual meeting in which the management slate was challenged by Ralph Nader's "Project Responsibility."

"I didn't even know at that time who Lawrence Walsh was," Burns says. He soon found out.

As Burns remembers their first meeting, from the outset Walsh was "very abrasive."

"Is this the policy of John Mitchell?" he asked.

"I don't know," Burns replied. "But his office has approved similar prosecutions in the past."

"Do you mind if I check with him?"

And a few minutes later: "Is this the policy of Dick Kleindienst?"

Burns said it was.

"Do you mind if I go see him?"

Seymour had disqualified himself from supervision of the GM case because his former firm, Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, had represented the auto company on occasion. In fact, while the case was pending, Ross Malone, GM's general counsel, was arranging a testimonial dinner for Seymour's father.

The younger Seymour named his chief assistant, Silvio Mollo, acting U. S. Attorney for the GM case. Burns

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and Mollo seldom saw eye to eye on the action. According to Burns, Mollo, practically a career assistant who specialized in criminal cases, considered water-pollution cases a waste of the office's efforts. When Mollo gave Walsh two extensions of time on the case, Burns protested: "That's not our policy." But Mollo replied, "That's when you're dealing with a different kind of lawyer."

A few days later, a Davis, Polk lawyer arrived in Burns' office with a memorandum on the case and "an oral message that Walsh was on his way to Washington to give the memo to Dick Kleindienst."

No Apologies Needed with Walsh

Burns checked with his superiors in Washington and was told the case against GM was "the best they'd ever seen." Then Burns wrote a letter to GM Chairman John M. Roche—the man who several years before was obliged to apologize to Nader—complaining about Walsh's threats to use "political influence to interfere with the pollution investigation." The letter went on:

> At least once before, GM attorneys assumed no one would be willing to lay his career on the line to see that the General Motors Corp. complied with rules of behavior applicable to all others, and Mr. Nader's discoveries... seriously injured the corporation's image.
>
> Please be advised that there are many in this office who would also lay their careers on the line to insure that this office treats General Motors exactly the same as any other firm.

Little did Burns know then how prophetic that would be.

Walsh went to Washington—though he insists that "I never spoke with anyone above the level of the career people." It seems strange. Can a former Deputy Attorney General wander through the Justice Department offices on an out-of-town visit without paying at least a courtesy call on his successor, especially one with whom he was in almost daily tele-

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

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phone contact? Could Roswell Gilpatric return to the Pentagon and speak with no one above the rank of major?

In any event, the result of Walsh's visit was clear. Burns was ordered to drop the criminal action against GM and work out a civil settlement. Reluctantly, Burns did so. Throughout the evening of Friday, January 8, 1971, he and Walsh negotiated the terms of the agreement. This time, Burns says, Walsh was "very charming and pleasant."

The settlement was signed at 10 p.m. Burns brought the document to Seymour's office. Seymour took it and handed Burns his walking papers. Burns asked that he be allowed to remain until the GM case was concluded; Seymour refused. For a while, Seymour insisted that Burns had resigned; later he admitted that he'd been fired—though the exact reasons were never disclosed.

Burns—who returned to a small Wall Street securities firm, and later ran for Congress from the Hudson Valley—blames Walsh for his ouster. "It's such a heavy-handed way to do it," he says, "but then you don't get a reputation for being tough by being discreet."

Walsh denies that he had anything to do with Burns' ouster—though he later admitted that when he went to Washington he carried a letter to Kleindienst complaining about the New York assistant, but never delivered it.

"There was never any effort to have him fired," he insists. "He was his own worst enemy. It was his high-handed approach. His problems may have arisen from this lawsuit, but it was his own conduct that brought them on."

Walsh says he was as surprised as anyone that Burns was fired. "We signed the decree with Burns and I had no expectation that he wasn't going to handle the case from then on."

Nearly two years later, the question of whether GM complied with the decree remains open. The irony, according to Burns, is that it would have cost GM only two dollars a day to meet federal antipollution standards at the Tarrytown plant.



New Yorker May Dire
Watergate Investig

By ANTHONY RIPLEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 5—The search for a special supervising prosecutor in the Watergate case is being quietly pressed by unidentified Government officials.

Sources in Washington familiar with the search said that two judges of the United States Court of Appeals in New York had been approached. One was offered the job and the other was asked to comment on some proposed candidates and recommend others.

Law Firm I. T. T. Counsel

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When ITT Needs the Very Best

Walsh's next case involved one of Davis, Polk's oldest and biggest clients—ITT. As a result of columnist Jack Anderson's disclosure of the now-famous Dita Beard memo, ITT's antitrust settlement was headline news for months. This is not the place to recapitulate all the threads of the complex plot, only Walsh's small but significant role in the settlement.

Davis, Polk had been ITT's outside counsel for more than 50 years, but as ITT started its sweeping conglomeration in the 1960s, it began using other law firms, especially those that had represented the subsidiaries it absorbed.

ITT's acquisitions had received the green light from the Johnson Adminis-

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
General un-
isenhower, a
District Court
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his law firm is pri-
l counsel to the In-
al Telephone and Tele-
orporation.
Valsh said at one point
ay that he had not been
to. However, it was be-
that contacts were made
yesterday. He could not be
hed today for comment.

Walsh's reputation remains such that last month The New York Times *reported him to be a leading candidate for special prosecutor in the Watergate case.*

tration, but they came under a heavy attack from the dedicated trust-buster appointed by Nixon and Mitchell—Richard McLaren. He filed suit to dissolve three recent ITT mergers—with Grinnell Company, Canteen Corporation, and Hartford Fire Insurance. By April, 1971, the first of the cases—Grinnell—was ready for argument before the Supreme Court.

Davis, Polk was not ITT's counsel in the antitrust actions; that task was handled by the Washington firm, Covington & Burling. But ITT was so concerned about losing the Grinnell case, and thereby creating a bad precedent for the more important Hartford merger, that it hired extra help—Lawrence Walsh.

Walsh, Fritz Schwartz, Davis, Polk's senior partner, and associate Guy Sturve conferred with ITT President Harold S. Geneen and Howard J. Aibel, its general counsel. As Walsh later testified: "Mr. Geneen was concerned that the Department's policy was really ignoring. . . the destructive economic effects of a rigid bar to conglomerate mergers even though they were of large companies. He felt. . . that these mergers, large and small, served an important purpose in avoiding stagnation in management, stagnation in industries, and in giving companies like ITT, which has large foreign commitments and risks, a more stable and safe diversified base in this country."

Geneen testified that he "asked Judge Walsh. . . to see if he could persuade them, the Department of Justice, to consider a review of [its antitrust policies]. I do not consider that an interference. It was an open and honest request, and judgment was to be made by them." In fact, Geneen deemed the matter so important that he wanted Walsh to make a presentation to the President, but Walsh dissuaded him. As it turned out, Geneen made the approach to the White House through others.

Attorney General Mitchell had disqualified himself in the ITT cases because his former firm, Mudge Rose, had handled some minor matters for ITT—$1,015 worth in 1969; $45,768 in 1970; and $44,047 in 1971. That left Kleindienst in charge of the case, presenting Walsh with a problem. Kleindienst could act on ITT, but only Mitchell could authorize the full-scale review Geneen wanted.

"We were confronted with a very serious obstacle by Mr. Mitchell's disqualification," Walsh said. "We went to Kleindienst with the hope that he could bring Mitchell back in and at least get his consent to a full-fledged presentation to him and the Secretaries of Treasury and Commerce of Mr. Geneen's view of conglomerate mergers."

Two Minutes Does the Trick

On April 16, Walsh called Kleindienst. With the meticulous logging necessary for billing, Davis, Polk's records showed the conversation lasted two minutes. Walsh told him that he was sending down a memoran-

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dum requesting "government-wide review of the Administration policy toward mergers and diversification." That afternoon, Sturve delivered to Kleindienst the memo and a covering letter from Walsh that afternoon:

Dear Dick:

As I told you over the telephone, our firm has represented ITT, as outside counsel, ever since its incorporation over 50 years ago. A few weeks ago, Mr. Harold S. Geneen, chairman and president of ITT, asked me to prepare a presentation to you as acting Attorney General and, through you, to the national Administration on the question of whether diversification mergers should be barred and, more specifically, urging that the Department of Justice not advocate any position before the Supreme Court which would be tantamount to barring such mergers without a full study of the economic consequences of such a step.

To us this is not a question of the conduct of litigation in the narrow sense. *Looking back at the results of government antitrust cases in the Supreme Court, one must realize that if the government urges an expanded interpretation of the vague language of the Clayton Act, there is a high probability that it will succeed.* Indeed, the Court has at times adopted a position more extreme than that urged by the Department. We therefore believe that the Department should not take such a step without all of the usual precautions that precede a recommendation for new legislation. . . .

It is our hope that after reading the enclosed memorandum, which is merely a preliminary presentation, you and Dick McLaren and the Solicitor General would be willing to delay the submission of the jurisdictional settlement in the Grinnell case long enough to permit us to make a more adequate presentation on this question. . . [Italics added.]

With kindest regards,
Sincerely yours,
Lawrence E. Walsh

"There is a high probability that it will succeed." To some it seemed as if ITT was saying, "You're going to win, so let's make a deal." And the government made a deal.

North Carolina Senator Sam Ervin, no novice at arguing before the Supreme Court, called it "a most interesting letter. . . . When I was practicing law, I did not make admissions of that character against my clients."

Walsh's first priority was to get the Grinnell case delayed, a touchy business since the normal 10-day deadline for requesting extensions of time had already elapsed.

McLaren was opposed. Solicitor General Erwin Griswold—in charge of Justice Department proceedings before the Supreme Court—was neutral. He noted that a last-minute request for an extension of time would be "quite unusual." Yet, he agreed to the delay because "the Deputy Attorney General wanted it." But Kleindienst had also professed neutrality. In fact, he claimed he hadn't even read Walsh's memo, merely turned it over to McLaren's office. Then who wanted the delay? Senator Edward Kennedy put the question to McLaren: "Who did care whether there was an extension. . . ?"

"I guess Judge Walsh cared," McLaren replied.

"And ITT cared," Kennedy added.

The question of *why* remains open. The best answer seems to be that Kleindienst ordered the delay as a courtesy to Walsh. "That is the relationship I had with Judge Walsh, the fact that he was a former Deputy Attorney General," Kleindienst said. "He isn't an ordinary attorney, as far as I am concerned."

On April 19, three days after the letter was sent, Kleindienst called this "extraordinary" attorney and told him the extension would be requested.

That ended Walsh's role in the case. While the Grinnell case remained pending, others representing ITT made contact with the Administration and worked out a satisfactory settlement.

Ironically, Walsh considers that he *lost* both the GM and ITT actions. With GM, he never blocked the grand-jury inquiry. With ITT, he never got the inter-departmental review he sought. "The value of the delay was really inconsequential," he insists. One wonders whether GM and ITT would agree. ■

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Reassurance From the Folks Who Gave Us General Lavelle

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 20330

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Dear Mrs. Jaworski:

On behalf of President Nixon, I am replying to your letter of June 19, 1971, regarding Federalist Letter comments ". . . that four launch officers can trigger World War III. without orders from anyone."

It should first be pointed out that the Minuteman System has been specifically designed with multiple monitoring and redundant inhibit capability to prevent irrational acts. Although the system is so designed that four officers in two widely separated locations, acting in unison, can initiate a launch upon receipt of a valid launch directive, for four officers to precipitate such a launch without an authenticated command presumes multiple failures in the elaborate system established to prevent just such an occurrence.

The personnel part of the weapon system has been designed, structured, and is continually managed to insure responsible actions on the part of missile launch officers to preclude unauthorized launches. Missile officers are constantly monitored as are all people entrusted with access to the Nation's nuclear deterrent. Extensive background investigations, a detailed medical record review by qualified medical personnel and a personal interview by his commander are completed before an individual can perform missile combat crew alert duty. Motivation programs to insure alertness and awareness of duty are periodically conducted during training. Human reliability monitoring by the individual's military peers, his superiors

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and by the flight surgeon is much more extensive than that which is evident to missile launch officers. The individual's conduct is closely observed and commanders are aware of social and family activities without violation of privacy and dignity. Personal problems, habit changes, and attitude deviations are also considered. Crew members who fail to meet these standards are rejected from the missile program permanently. Some are separated from the service and others are reassigned to duties not associated with the security or capability of the nuclear force.

Our command control and Human Reliability Program strengths are improved by responding to concerns raised by responsible people. An individual identifying, evaluating and then reporting areas he considers questionable causes the Air Force to respond to each report and reevaluate the system. A continuing critical self-evaluation searches for potential weaknesses. The record speaks for itself. The program is rigorous and it works. Continued attention insures that the system will be effective in the future.

I hope this information will be helpful.

Sincerely,

/S/

B. M. ETTENSON
Colonel, USAF

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the political puzzle

by John Barclay



ACROSS

1. Spoke to both Reds and deads. (9)
6. With four in, Commander-in-Chief does his duty. (5)
9. A sip of coffee in Alamo chamber. (5)
10. If good, a paving stone for descending road. (9)
11. Aligned with Wheeling. (7)
12. Pet puss tightens the pressure. (5, 2)
13. East End of Chicago has passed. (3)
14. Way to walk on Crete. (5)
16. Transplant back for one who indulges. (5)
18. Cleans behind studs. (5)
20. Sam Snead reaches new heights. (5)
22. Herring or bait in Washington. (3)
23. Trust Al Green to blow things up. (7)
25. Fairness is mere cold water to Nixon? (7)
27. Guilty of sweet talk with Victor and Theodore. (9)
29. A little spice in old tales. (5)
30. Drowning man grips any shoot. (5)
31. Get singer to deliver opening remarks. (9)

DOWN

1. The way we dream of walking in Central Park. (5)
2. Harsh bosses, doubly so to their secretaries. (9)
3. Formerly an explosive device, look it over! (7)
4. Barb found in most in-group jokes. (5)
5. Little Department on the spot. (3)
6. What's in and satisfied. (7)
7. How gold is found on the vines. (5)
8. Watergate men and son priced 25 Across low. (9)
12. Ate too much in my stead. (5)
13. What spectators cause Enid to do. (9)
15. In Kiev, adept thieves get away with this. (5)
17. In Hell, there is nothing intrepid. (9)
19. Arranging for no grits is easy in D. C. (7)
21. Pet cuss feels police pressure tighten. (7)
24. Sophia Loren does this all by herself. (5)
25. Landis, Byrne, or Medina. (5)
26. Sees a better way through red tape. (5)
28. Ticket on gun upside down. (3)

The numbers indicate the number of letters and words, e.g., (2, 3) means a two-letter word followed by a three-letter word. Groups of letters, e.g., USA, are treated as one word. Answers to last month's puzzle are on page 10.

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Black and White Together Is Still the Point

by Walter Shapiro

For years finding a liberal who opposed school integration was as unlikely as finding an admirer of Golda Meir in the El Fatah. Those were the days when anyone who doubted the rectitude of the cause was dismissed as a "racist" or harangued for giving way to "backlash."

But with the emergence of "busing" as a noun which triggers the same parental fears once reserved for LSD, times have begun to change. Many liberals now doubt whether further school desegregation is worth fighting for. Some of these second thoughts are triggered by political timidity—somewhat understandable when even a poll by the U. S. Civil Rights Commission shows that 70 per cent of those sampled opposed busing and another nine per cent had "no opinion." But the real problem is the growing crisis of the liberal spirit as many question whether busing is defensible as a tactic, whether school integration is laudable as a goal.

Busing has faded from the headlines in this year of the permanent Watergate Crisis, but by the end of June the Supreme Court is expected to decide two cases which will bring the whole dispute back into the forefront. A Denver case, *Keyes v School District No. 1*, will provide the Court with its first opportunity to decide whether to apply to the North the same standards used in desegregating Southern school systems. In all likelihood, a Richmond case, *Bradley v School Board of the City of Richmond*, will be even more important. Argued in April, it is the first metropolitan cross-district busing case to go before the Supreme Court.

While predicting the behavior of the Court is riskier than reading entrails, the omens seem propitious for the civil rights forces, especially in the Richmond case. Such Supreme Court action would bring anti-busing legislation to the floor of Congress with the speed of a prairie fire. Last fall, Senate liberals choked off a stiff anti-busing

Walter Shapiro is an editor of The Washington Monthly.

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bill with an end-of-the-session filibuster, but few are optimistic about a repeat performance.

It is significant that the arguments of those who have defended busing have leaned toward the limited and the legalistic. Senate liberals justified their filibuster because they contended anti-busing legislation was unconstitutional. Even Clarence Mitchell, the veteran Washington lobbyist for the NAACP, is not effusive in his praise of busing. To him it is simply an expedient necessary "to enforce the 14th Amendment."

Many may see this admittedly bleak political landscape as further evidence that busing should be abandoned as a tactic. But let those who consider this option have no illusions about its consequences. As patterns of residential segregation in the North show no signs of abating, we are steadily moving toward a dual school system there almost as far-reaching as the one which existed until recently in the South. Already the situation has become significantly worse above, rather than below, the Mason-Dixon line. In 1970, 57 per cent of the black students in the North attended segregated schools, while in the South the figure had declined to 40 per cent. The problem is at its worst in our largest cities. Less than 10 per cent of black students in Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, or Detroit attend schools with a majority white enrollment.

My own personal conviction that busing must be defended has little to do with the 14th Amendment or separation of powers. It is not predicated on elaborate constitutional grounds, nor does it reflect the fatalism of "the Court has spoken." I believe that busing should be defended simply because segregated schools are wrong. "Wrong" to me is a moral judgment, rather than an outgrowth of any elaborate theory about the effects of segregation on children's test scores. Perhaps ideally, we could attack segregated schools by trying to change housing patterns, but as Bill Taylor, former chairman of the U. S. Civil Rights Commission, points out, "The courts are currently very hesi-

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tant to take on new social and economic issues. Because of precedents they are willing to go much further on school integration than any other issue."

Probably the most valid objection to busing is the argument that it is often "class legislation"—integrating blacks primarily with working-class whites. In Pontiac, Michigan, for example, busing involved only residents of this grimy industrial town, leaving immune those whites affluent enough to escape to the suburbs.

Situations like Pontiac gave rise to the notion that the only people supporting busing were affluent liberals who knew their children wouldn't have to be bused. The best answer to this objection was last year's ruling by federal Judge Stephen Roth (currently pending in the U. S. Court of Appeals, awaiting the outcome of the Richmond case), ordering widespread busing between Detroit and more than 50 suburban school districts. Whites in Pontiac could find some consolation in the Roth decision, which linked the schools of Grosse Pointe with those in the inner city. Metropolitan busing also tends to slow—if not reverse—white exodus to the suburbs because it carries the important symbolic message that you can no longer buy your way out of urban problems.

Actually, in a city like Detroit—or Atlanta, New Orleans, Newark, Baltimore, or St. Louis—with a school system which is two-thirds black, metropolitan busing is virtually the only way of achieving desegregation. Yet suits have been brought in cities like these to "integrate" the school systems by apportioning out with mathematical exactitude the few remaining white students and allotting them to overwhelmingly black schools. This kind of city-wide plan isn't desegregation, it is merely a kind of excessively officious tokenism which gives busing a bad name and hastens white flight to the suburbs. In contrast, the Roth decision, if upheld by the higher courts, would create schools throughout the entire Detroit metropolitan area which would be three-quarters white and one-quarter black.

Hawking Busing, Not Snake Oil

Some of the rationale behind the massive opposition to such metropolitan plans is the widespread conviction that this method of desegregation means a sharp increase in busing. This is not necessarily the case, partially because more than 40 per cent of all children are already bused to school for reasons of distance, not racial balance. But demographic factors help explain why metropolitanism and massive busing are not automatically synonymous. In Richmond, for example, large numbers of blacks live on the city's borders adjoining the white suburbs. Busting school district lines would mean that many black students in Richmond could attend these currently all-white suburban schools, often by just walking a few blocks beyond the city limits.

Housing patterns in the Richmond area are such that Tom Pettigrew, a professor of social psychology at Harvard, believes that a metropolitan desegregation plan could be drawn up which would actually mean *less* busing than exists today. Described by a supporter as "one hell of a snake-oil salesman, but *our* snake-oil salesman," Pettigrew stressed that this pattern was not unique to the South. Boston, for example, he said "would need little busing to desegregate because the ghetto is long and thin" and adjoins such prestigious suburban schools as those of Brookline. In a Northern city like Detroit, with the black population concentrated in its inner core, Pettigrew believes that the most efficient metropolitan desegregation plan would require about 25 per cent more busing than exists today. (The busing plan produced by Judge Roth, working with a map and a ruler, would increase the number of students bused daily by 38 per cent—from about 210,000 to 290,000.)

Obviously, busting district lines can have little relevance for concen-

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trated ghettos like Bedford-Stuyvesant, Watts, and the South Side of Chicago. Even the most ardent integrationist must realize that there are areas of the country where more than token desegregation may, unfortunately, be impossible. Recognizing these areas as exceptions, the Court—or HEW, if it ever gets back into the civil rights business—should not try to mandate busing with the same sense of statistical precision demanded, say, for congressional redistricting.

At the root of much of the opposition to busing is parental fear for their children's safety. Most white parents have rather fixed images of all-black urban schools—heroin in the hallways and muggings in the parking lot. Obviously, no parent should be expected to send his child to schools like these. But in most places desegregation has profoundly changed the tenor of inner-city schools. Where desegregation has failed it has generally been because the middle class has pulled their children out of the public schools instead of giving integration a chance. The prime example of this is Washington, D. C., where both black and white leaders—including the bulk of the city's liberals—promptly abandoned the school system.

Yet the failures of desegregation in places like Washington have led many to wonder aloud whether it would be possible to actually enforce widespread busing even if it were upheld by the courts and not challenged by Congress. The spectre of bus burnings in Pontiac and the actual attack on a jammed school bus in Lamar, South Carolina, are cited as harbingers of national violent resistance to school busing. It is a serious fear, and the best assessment of it that I've heard came from Tom Pettigrew, who said:

> In the South in the 1950s there was at least as much opposition to integration as exists in metropolitan Detroit right now. Where there was firm leadership, it came off well. White violence is very rational, it occurs only after there are signals from white politicians that it might help. They burned the buses in Pontiac only one week after Nixon went on television to oppose busing—he should have been a defendant in the case. In social psychology there is something called the *fait accompli* effect. What it means is that when something happens which is unalterable, people adjust to it. They may not like it, but they accept it.

Although some of the current liberal malaise over desegregation stems from considerations like these, probably the most potent factor behind their despair is the prevalent impression that social science has shown that integration accomplishes little.

Sitting across a Senate desk from Republican Senator Bill Brock of Tennessee, one of the most articulate congressional opponents of busing, I suddenly realized why liberals had believed that they needed social science evidence to justify desegregation. In response to my questions, which tried to convey the horror of extensive school segregation 19 years after *Brown v Board of Education*, Brock mechanically used a whole set of meaningless phrases like "fullest and fairest and equal treatment," and "quality education" to justify his support for the racial status quo.

Unable to pierce Brock's carefully cultivated public image, I sat there tongue-tied and repressed the strong temptation to resort to epithets ("racist" unfairly, but predictably, sprang to mind). But I realized that it would have been far more devastating to be able to lean forward and say with my best William Buckley sneer, "You of course know, Senator, that science has proved that segregated schools do irreparable damage to the education of children—both black and white?"

A brilliant tactic, save for the lack of agreement among social scientists. As names like Jencks, Coleman, Armor, and Pettigrew are bandied about by all sides in the busing dispute, it is important to understand this deeply felt need to make social scientists "expert witnesses" on school desegregation.

Busing, like amnesty and abortion,

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is one of those issues which is almost completely visceral, almost entirely non-rational. Either you see something fundamentally wrong with widespread school segregation or you don't. But you cannot debate the issue in the same dispassionate way you would discuss a subject like the energy crisis. Frustrated by the rhetorical limitations of emotional arguments, liberals appealed to a higher authority for a final decision—the social scientist. One reason why liberals succumbed so easily to the "cult of the expert" was that they were convinced that social science would obediently justify their gut feelings that school segregation was wrong.

The first real attempt to mobilize "proof" was the 1966 Coleman Report—a massive study of school facilities, racial segregation, and academic achievement, funded by HEW and conducted by James Coleman of Johns Hopkins. Published under the title, *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, it unfortunately undermined liberal preconceptions by revealing only miniscule differences between segregated and desegregated schools in terms of facilities (a catch-all term which encompassed everything from the presence of a physics lab or a school nurse to the credentials of the teacher and the amount of money spent per pupil by the school district).

Coleman also distressed liberals by reaching the not surprising conclusion that in determining academic achievement, home environment plays a much greater role than anything that happens in the schools. The only consoling evidence in the Coleman Report was that within the schools a student's achievement was most affected by the socio-economic background of his fellow students. Since white schools tended to be much more middle-class than black schools, these findings were widely advertised as an endorsement of desegregation.

Against the backdrop of the Coleman Report, liberals came to believe that segregation was wrong for objective reasons (it deprived black students of a middle-class environment and thereby lowered test scores) and forgot the fundamental principle that segregation is wrong because it is morally repugnant.

Consequently, it was easy to understand liberal dismay when two studies bearing the imprimatur of Harvard announced last year that desegregation had, at best, only a minor impact on black students' test scores. These studies touched off two distinct—although often confusing and occasionally overlapping—academic disputes which were routinely cited in Washington to buttress each side of the busing debate.

The two studies relied on entirely different types of data. One, "The Evidence on Busing," by David Armor, published last summer in *The Public Interest*, was a study of the results of five Northern busing experiments and claimed that integration did little to help black academic achievement or improve racial attitudes.

In the other, *Inequality: a Reassessment of the Effects of Family and Schooling in America*, Christopher Jencks disclosed that not only do factors like racial composition and school expenditures have a minimal effect on test scores, but academic achievement and high test scores have relatively little impact on vocational and economic success. Jencks' book is primarily statistical, building on the data from the Coleman Report—already subjected to extensive reanalysis—and combining it with the results of other studies.

One Thing Everyone Agrees On

Both Jencks and Armor have been subjected to rigorous criticism—Armor in particular. In understanding this entire debate, which largely revolves around the relationship between desegregation and test scores, it is important to realize that there is general agreement that neither desegregation nor busing has a negative impact on white students' test scores or academic achievement. The only real question

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is what impact it has on black test scores. Since, according to Jencks, "the average white child scores about 15 points higher on standardized tests than the average black child," or, to put it another way, "the average black 18-year-old has scores comparable to a white 14- or 15-year-old," this is not a minor question.

As the smoke from the reviews, the "responses," and the "final words" have begun to settle, it is apparent that Armor's study is almost a classic case of how not to conduct social science research in a volatile situation.

Although Armor's conclusions purportedly apply to "mandatory" busing, three of the five busing experiments he cites were actually "voluntary." And, with only one exception, Armor is dealing solely with the first year of busing, when confusion and dislocation would be at their peak.

The headlines read "Study Casts Doubt on Busing," but few readers realized how subjective these doubts actually were. To Armor, busing is successful only if it narrows the gap between white and black test scores. By defining success this way—rather than, for example, comparing black scores to black norms—Armor creates a situation where busing could be judged highly successful if white test scores plummeted to black levels. Another example of the ambiguities of Armor's study revolves around what constitutes improved race relations. Armor believes that the increases in "black consciousness and solidarity" and support for "black power" he discovered meant a decline in racial understanding. Yet these changes in black student attitudes could be seen by another researcher as a positive step toward an improved black self-image.

Although they are sometimes mistakenly lumped together, Jencks is taken far more seriously than Armor by his colleagues and does not agree with Armor's findings. Jencks' discussion of desegregation and the impact of other educational factors on test scores plays an important role in the busing dispute, but it is peripheral to the main point of his book. What Jencks is really trying to demonstrate is how small the relationship actually is between academic ability and schooling and vocational and financial success. His work is an outgrowth of the continuing debate over the guaranteed annual income and income redistribution. Evidently, Jencks' hope was that by demonstrating that such indirect approaches as educational reform would do little to end economic inequality, he would strengthen the case for direct income redistribution.

Jencks has instead become, in part, the victim of the peculiar rhythms of both publishing and politics. He finished his manuscript on the eve of the Democratic Convention, during a time of intense discussion of alternative strategies for liberal reform. But the book wasn't published until right before the election, when it was interpreted as another clarion call to dismantle the 1960s. Consequently,

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rather than increasing the constituency for income redistribution, he was linked with the slogan "schools don't make a difference."

It is important to remember that Jencks believes that desegregated schools do make some difference. In line with Coleman, Jencks found:

> About 80 per cent of all blacks were in predominantly black schools in 1965. They averaged 15 points below the white mean on standardized tests. Our best guess is that desegregation raises black scores by two to three points. Eliminating *all* predominantly black schools might therefore reduce the overall black-white gap from 15 to 12 or 13 points. Such a gain would not be completely trivial, but it would certainly not have much effect on the overall pattern of racial inequality in America.

Despite the heavy use of test scores to measure academic success in *Inequality*, Jencks stresses in conversation that "there is a strong non-cognitive feeling to the book." By non-cognitive, Jencks means virtually everything which can't be measured by the standardized tests that are the basis of so much of Coleman's—and Jencks' own—data. One of the conclusions of *Inequality* is that the "non-cognitive effects of schooling are likely to be more important than the cognitive effects"; but this is buried in the book's shortest—and only non-statistical—chapter.

I'm certain Jencks wanted to write a book about the non-cognitive aspects of schooling and desegregation. But as a quantitative social scientist, Jencks can write only about that which he can measure. And as he explains in the book's first chapter, "While cognitive tests have many obvious defects, most measures of attitudes, values, and character structure are even worse." *Et voilà*, a book about cognitive tests.

Not Capone, But Jencks

From the point of view of school administrators, Jencks is fairly close to being Public Enemy Number One. For example, the American Association of School Administrators has published a pamphlet, "Christopher Jencks in Perspective," which is largely a series of responses to quotes from *Inequality* like this:

> The character of a school's output depends largely on a single input, namely, the characteristics of the entering children. Everything else—the school budget, its policies, the characteristics of the teachers—is either secondary or completely irrelevant.

There is no way to minimize how threatening such conclusions are to education bureaucrats. For a school superintendent trying to coax more money out of the state government, it is less than reassuring to read, "We found that when we compared an impoverished high school to one that spent twice as much, students in the rich school gained no more between ninth and twelfth grades than students in the poor school." Findings like these seem at first to be quite otherworldly and encourage the easy conclusion that Jencks' book is about numbers rather than real children and real schools. It seems difficult to believe that schools with vast resources and the latest curricula aren't significantly better than schools with much less money and traditional course structures.

Yet on reconsideration, Jencks' conclusions aren't all that contrary to common sense. Inherent within them are some important implications about the relationship between educational bureaucracies and the classroom. But the shock waves Jencks has caused demonstrate how few people really understand the degree to which schools are different from other large organizations in our society.

In any bureaucracy, those on top have extreme difficulty in controlling—or even finding out—what actually happens on the lower levels where the institution actually intersects with the outside world. Yet no bureaucrat is more immune to centralized direction than a veteran teacher. Who else performs his daily tasks not only free from administrative supervision, but in a work environment entirely devoid

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the presence of any other adults? What administrator visiting a regional office is confronted with as artificial and unrealistic a setting as a principal observing classroom teaching?

Moreover, thanks to strong, aggressive unions, teachers have job security equal to the most indolent of bureaucrats. Short of public sexual misconduct, it is extremely difficult for any tenured teacher to lose his job. The tradition that the teacher is king in his own classroom means that an instructor determines his own working habits or teaching style virtually independent of all outside authority. Admittedly, teachers may have to go through the motions of adopting a new curriculum or accepting some other administrative decision, but, in reality, the independence of most teachers all but guarantees that these changes don't have to be more than token or minimal.

Today, in at least 70 per cent of all elementary schools and 85 per cent of all high schools, there is "tracking" or "ability grouping" designed to create homogeneous classrooms. For teachers, the elements of self-fulfilling prophesy inherent in tracking can serve as a way of avoiding painful self-evaluation. Given a classroom of bright, interested students, a mediocre teacher will take great pride in how much they learn—little realizing that it is in spite, rather than because, of his instruction. A teacher who fails to reach students in the "slow" track can justify his failure by reminding himself that they are certified dullards.

Money Can't Buy Rapport

Against this backdrop of teachers insulated from both real supervision and critical self-evaluation, it is possible to see why there is so little correlation in Jencks' study between elements like expenditure levels and student achievement. What Jencks and Coleman were measuring were the bureaucratic factors in education, things like physics labs, which are easily countable. What they could not measure is the only variable which is really important—teacher quality and dedication. (Admittedly, they did measure factors like credentials and length of service, but even educational traditionalists will admit that such elements have little or no relationship to teacher quality.)

Teacher quality is not an irrelevant subject in a discussion of busing and school segregation. Inner-city schools tend to disproportionately attract veteran teachers—largely because salaries are highest in urban areas, due to the presence of strong teachers' unions. Although there are obviously conspicuous exceptions, these veteran teachers tend to be set in their ways and unwilling to modify their methods to meet the educational needs of their students. I suspect that this is not primarily a racial problem and that veteran black teachers tend to be as remote and as intractable as their white colleagues.

Despite his facility with path diagrams and statistical analyses, Jencks is one person who senses the importance of the individual teacher and his attitudes. During our conversation, he said, "If you were to go into schools in different major cities around the country and wander into classrooms randomly, I suspect what you would discover is that the richest schools are not necessarily the best. And the thing you would probably value most is the way the teacher ran the classes and the rapport he or she had with the students."

Where then does social science leave us in regard to busing? By now, it should be obvious how tentative and narrow the results of these much-publicized studies really are. Jencks puts it bluntly, "The only thing I'm sure about is that social scientists don't have a shred of relevant evidence to bring to this whole busing debate." He praises the Supreme Court—in contrast to some of the lower federal courts—for recognizing this and not buttressing any of their school desegregation decisions with social science evidence. (The one ex-

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ception to this is a single footnote in *Brown v Board of Education*.) "The Supreme Court," Jencks said, "realized that they can't change their minds every time a new article appears in *The American Journal of Sociology*."

This is not to say that there is nothing to be learned from current busing programs. But while such findings can be revealing for what they say about improving education for children of all races, they should not be seized on as a new rationale for desegregation. For the only reasons needed to justify integration are moral, rather than educational.

Learning That You Can't Teach

Gary Orfield, on leave from Princeton to serve as "scholar in residence" at the U. S. Civil Rights Commission, recently completed an extended examination of more than 15 school systems around the country, which currently employ busing. Talking with him, I not only received an impressionistic glimpse of what happens after a school desegregates, but was also provided with some hints about the unexpected long-term effects of busing.

The easiest way to thwart the purpose of busing is to create segregation in the classroom through the use of tracking or ability groups. Since both Coleman and Jencks found that there is a far greater range of abilities within a given school than between schools, the practical impact of tracking can be severe. But, Orfield noted, busing has instead served as a catalyst in most schools to abolish ability grouping and create heterogeneous classrooms.

In the schools which had abolished tracking, the first year of busing was literally hell. "Students adjust rapidly to the new situation," Orfield said, "but for teachers and administrators it takes a considerable amount of time." Teachers faced the obvious problems of readjusting their racial attitudes, but far more significantly, they also had to come to grips with the need to modify their teaching methods. Orfield quoted one veteran teacher who had spent her career teaching the off-spring of academic families in Berkeley, California. After a year of busing, she admitted, "Until I had to teach these other kids, I didn't know I didn't know how to teach."

The second year of busing generally signaled a vast change in teacher attitudes. Orfield found teachers considerably more willing to change their techniques as heterogeneous classes forced them to switch from lecturing to a style of teaching far more oriented to individual students. In urban areas, curriculum directors were often shocked to find veteran teachers coming to them voluntarily in search of new approaches and methods.

There were other changes in more predictable directions, such as drastic modifications in social studies curricula. "Every school I visited saw this as a major priority," Orfield said. Here, too, there were problems, as almost all teachers—both white *and* black—had themselves never been taught black contributions to American history. Catering to the educational needs of all the children—instead of aiming the curriculum primarily at the college-bound—also gave rise to a strong emphasis on the teaching of reading and math. Interestingly, in many schools one of the major beneficiaries of the new arrangement were non-academically inclined white students who had previously felt out of place and pressured in a highly competitive school environment.

Obviously, it would be easy to overstate the results of this preliminary research. Busing is certainly not a panacea for all our educational problems. But at the same time one should not minimize the impact of busing as a catalyst for creating fundamental changes in teachers' attitudes toward their work and their students. The major problem with urban schools is that they are locked into a series of patterns—destructive for the

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students and numbing for the teachers. What desegregation does—especially when accompanied by the end of tracking—is to shake up these established relationships and force new patterns to emerge. When teachers and administrators react to this new student environment by displaying leadership and a sense of mission about their craft, the result is a far healthier and more responsive school.

Babbitry Over Bigotry

Yet it is striking how widespread and ingrained is the belief that education can be improved principally through bureaucratic solutions and administrative changes. Nowhere is this paucity of imagination more evident than in the three most widely discussed alternatives to busing and further school desegregation—hiring more black administrators, compensatory education, and community control of the schools.

Since the rise of the "black power" movement, it has been fashionable for most liberals—and virtually all radicals—to obsequiously defer to the wishes of the black community on any question that even remotely touches on race. Not surprisingly, divining the feelings of the black community has played an integral part in the whole busing dispute.

Although opinion polls—perhaps not the most reliable of barometers for determining the sentiments of minority groups—show that blacks strongly support busing, anti-busing leaders take great pains to demonstrate their own black support. For example, Senator Brock conspicuously referred to the messages he'd received from black parents, and Republican Senator Robert Griffin, Michigan's gift to the anti-busing movement, read in a recent speech the entirety of a year-old letter from the black mayor of Insker, Michigan, urging him to "vote against massive busing."

There is something quite condescending in the prevalent belief that black leaders are more likely to put the interests of the group they represent ahead of their own short-term political self-interest than are their white counterparts. If black leaders ever had moral superiority in this regard, recent events in Atlanta show how equal things have become.

The New York Times called it "Atlanta's integration bargain" and suggested that it could alter "the course and theory of school desegregation. . . not just in Atlanta but also in other predominantly black. . . cities such as Richmond, Cleveland, and Detroit." What the bargain entailed was that Atlanta's black leadership would drop their city-wide desegregation suit in exchange for the white leadership's promise to appoint blacks to half the administrative positions in the school system and name a black as the next school superintendent.

While the new appointments may be politically significant, it is difficult to see how these black administrators—most of them likely to be veteran teachers—will be able to significantly affect realities in the classroom. Poor blacks in Atlanta tend to realize the implications of the trade-off between the education of their children and the desire of the black leadership to share in the spoils of a prosperous and growing Atlanta—"The City Too Busy to Hate." Writing in *The New Yorker*, Calvin Trillin quotes one group of poor black parents, who termed the agreement "trading off quality education for a few big jobs for a few big Negroes." And, to others, the compromise was not an epic breakthrough in administrative control, but "$500,000-worth of jobs." As Mrs. Ralph Abernathy put it recently, "If this is a 'City Too Busy to Hate,' I hope I'm not around when they get some time."

Defenders of the Atlanta settlement may argue that the city-wide busing suit would have accomplished little, anyway, since the city's school system is currently three-quarters black. But the black leadership con-

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spicuously did *not* support an ACLU suit calling for metropolitan desegregation, which would create schools with roughly a 70-30 white-black racial balance. Trillin puts his finger on the reason why—black leaders fear that metropolitanism "might lead to the dilution of black political power."

Why Hucksters Love Title I

Generally when anguished whites shout "Anything but busing," what they are thinking of is some form of compensatory education and the "anything" is the money to pay for it. The model compensatory education program is Title I of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which has given local school systems more than $1 billion a year to create special programs for disadvantaged pupils. Although it has its smattering of success stories, the program—like the Law Enforcement Assistance Act and revenue sharing—demonstrates the propensity of local governments to squander unrestricted federal grants.

As John F. Hughes and Anne O. Hughes point out in their recent book, *Equal Education*:

> In a very real sense, the education industry has performed much of the "thinking" for the schools in terms of educational programs [for Title I]. . . . Instead of taking a careful look at their own failures—the deprived children of the schools—the administrators turned first of all to the symbols of learning, the teacher's classroom equipment. And industry was out to sell the relevance of what they had, rather than to stop and consider the irrelevance to slum and isolated rural children of their white middle-class material and gadgetry geared to successful college-bound students.

The dominance of gimmickry and lack of imagination in Title I programs underlines Jencks' conclusion that "we can see no evidence that either school administrators or educational experts know how to raise test scores, even when they have vast resources at their disposal."

But just as Jencks does not conclude from his study that the school budget of New York City should be reduced by 50 per cent or that the public schools should be closed, we should not see the failures of Title I as immutable evidence that federal money cannot improve school quality and actually affect the realities in the classroom. (Additional teachers, for example, could be brought into each classroom with the money now spent on educational hardware.) But what the sad history of Title I illustrates is that black parents should not regard promises of additional money for ghetto schools as an irresistible bribe.

Racism or Paternalism?

These days cries for community control seem to come primarily from those—white and black—who see in busing the "paternalistic" notion that blacks can be educated only in majority white schools. (An aide to a liberal senator recently complained, "If we were to oppose busing, they'd call us 'racists'; so we support busing and they call us 'paternalistic.' ")

The tragic history of Ocean Hill-Brownsville and the guaranteed antipathy of the powerful teachers' unions to future experiments along this line are some of the reasons why it is so difficult to take community control seriously as a practical alternative. Moreover, as the Atlanta bargain illustrates, programs like community control are not only bureaucratic in conception, but also are far more likely to provide new jobs to be doled out by black leaders than to create real change in the classroom.

In response to cries of paternalism, one should not be embarrassed about clinging to the still touching 1950s image of black and white children playing together in a schoolyard. It may not exude radical chic and may seem naive in this justifiably cynical age, but it has the rare virtue of being right. Busing has far less to do with education than with whether we want an integrated or segregated society. Nineteen years after the *Brown* decision, I still choose integration. ■

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The Wife and Kids: Not the Excuse They Used to Be

by Michael Rappeport and Howard Van Lenten

Veteran recruiters of whistle-blowers in Washington and elsewhere have learned to recognize one sentence as a tell-tale sign that their efforts are about to fail. "If only it weren't for the wife and kids," says the accountant as he turns back to writing cost-overrun checks for a three-winged airplane, or the campaign treasurer as he neglects to mention a few cash-filled envelopes on his campaign spending report. This appeal to paternal responsibility has devastated even the Naders, who can hardly compete against it with their allusions to honesty and the public interest. For all the corporate and governmental abuses it leaves unexposed, the excuse at least leaves us with our national self-respect: our toasters may self-destruct and our government may be corrupt, but at least we are a decent enough people to put our families first.

The evidence is accumulating to show that "wife and kids" is beginning to rank only slightly below "separate but equal" on the list of great phony excuses. Many of those too timid to blow the whistle are as likely to end up on the breadline as Ross Perot. In fact, they are often heads of families whose greatest worry is likely to be how deeply the devaluation will cut into their purchasing power on the next trip to Europe. Their economic security is not necessarily based on their current high income, but on the extra cushion provided by capital.

We must reach back to the days of the Depression and World War II to find the roots of this increase in capital accumulation. In that era before inflation, when the only worry about "economic growth" was that we get enough of it fast enough, millions of middle-class parents started putting money away for the future. They stuffed extra funds into savings accounts, blue-chip stocks, and vacant lots in Arizona. Twenty-five years later, some of the parents are retired or deceased; now their children are the businessmen and professionals, with families of their own to care for. What makes today's adults different from their parents, whose financial incentive arose from first-hand experience during the Depression, is that an increasing number of families now have the kind of economic cushion that used to be restricted to the English gentry.

When their parents die, they will inherit enough money to allow them to overcome the "wife and kids" concerns in choosing their jobs and determining their values. Even before they actually acquire the estate, the knowledge that it is coming gives them a degree of independence that is denied to the family still counting on

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Social Security benefits for their old age.

Estate taxes are one indication of this economic change. Such taxes must be paid only when an estate is worth more than $60,000, so they are a reasonable indicator of the number of comfortable inheritances being passed on. In 1959, there were 55,685 individual estate tax returns filed; by 1970, the number had more than doubled to 133,944. Inflation had, of course, cut the value of the dollar somewhat (30 per cent) during that period, but even today a $60,000 estate takes some of the terror out of changing jobs or providing for the wife and kids after an act of conscience. Most of the estates, of course, are worth far more than the $60,000 minimum. And while 133,944 people are not enough to constitute a broad-based national trend, they do indicate a surprisingly wide distribution of inherited wealth—especially among the stratum of people who might become whistle-blowers in government or industry. Perhaps even more significant are the percentages: in 1954, only 2.5 per cent of those who died had estates worth enough to qualify for estate tax. Returns were filed for seven per cent of all estates in 1969, and the rate is climbing quickly.

The main elements that make up inherited wealth—real estate, stocks, and life insurance—each displays the same trend. Real estate provides the most immediately comprehensible examples, for each of us has had the disheartening experience of watching the house we saw advertised for $35,000 sell for $42,500 a year later. What diverts the national outcry from such trends to ballooning meat prices is that, while few of us are farmers or butchers, many of us own our own homes. In the last 30 years, the constant increase in real estate value has turned bungalows and deserted country acres into candidates for the estate tax. Since 1939, the value of residential real estate alone has increased by an average of $8.7 billion each year. The increase has been so rapid in recent years that many of today's families in effect provided their own inheritance when they bought a house 20 years ago.

Stocks and bonds, another important component of inherited wealth, have increased at an even more dramatic rate. During the 1940s, the market value of stocks and bonds increased by $1.3 billion each year; during the 1950s, the average yearly increase was $2.4 billion. But while the market is currently at 1968 levels, it should not be forgotten that during most of the 1960s, the market value of stocks and bonds rose by $15 billion every year. Ownership of these securities may not be as widespread as one might like, but some of these stockmarket gains are passed on to non-owners through inheritance.

The third important kind of inherited wealth, life insurance, affects a far broader group of people than do the other two. In 1971, there were 357 million life insurance policies in force (an average of about 1.7 per living American), with a total value of more than $1.5 *trillion*. In 1950, the average family held $4,600 worth of life insurance; by 1971, the figure had risen to an average of $21,800 in life insurance coverage for every single family. This increase, like those in real estate and stocks, represents an enormous gain even when inflation has been taken into consideration. Most of this increase is not included in the estate tax figures, since most insurance policies are owned by the beneficiary and therefore not counted in the taxable estate.

None of these figures tells us much about general problems of poverty and inequality in America, but they have an important bearing on questions of courage and honesty in business and government. Those people whose futures are being made secure by inherited wealth are in general the same professional people in a position to notice when a company or agency flagrantly violates the public interest. If they don't speak up, we shouldn't blame the wife and kids. ■

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Memo of the Month

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY
USAF ACADEMY, COLORADO 80840

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: SUPT/4140 2 February 1973

SUBJECT:

MEMO FOR: DF (Gen Woodyard)
CW (Gen Vandenberg)
TO: AH (Col Merritt)

1. I often hear from cadets that they are living in a completely protected environment wherein they are given no opportunity to make a decision for themselves or to regulate their lives. They are told when to get up, go to bed, study, play, etc.

2. I wonder how often they are permitted to make these charges unchallenged by those who could and should remind them that the life of a military man is an ordered existence, and that there is no historical precedent for an efficient fighting force—especially using highly technical weapons systems emerging from a raggety taggle operation.

3. Further, I wonder how often young men who complain that they are given no responsibility to regulate their lives and to make important decisions for themselves are reminded that the big things are on their own shoulders fair and square—such as the decision to perform up to their potential rather than to "ride the curve;" the decision to comply with the spirit and the intent of regulations rather than play games with the administration; the decision to support their element, flight, squadron, group and Wing leaders—especially in the tough ones where support is important to protect the standards and effectiveness of the Wing. No one but the individual cadet can make the decision and accept the responsibility to "not go over the hill;" to resist the temptations to self abuse with sex, alcohol, or drugs; to support the team rather than just to order the doolies to do it; to slop around and project a "cool" attitude towards the whole show and thus project a poor example to the doolies? Each cadet who moans about the lack of responsibility should take a moment to answer the question: "Who but you is responsible for the big ones?"

4. I would suggest that he who complains about the ordered existence is guilty of myopic vision and is: "sweating the little ones."

A. R. CLARK, Lt General, USAF
Superintendent

"MAN'S FLIGHT THROUGH LIFE IS SUSTAINED BY THE POWER OF HIS KNOWLEDGE."

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Living Through the Boss- A Day in the Life of a Senator's A.A.

by Polly Toynbee

Seven a.m. Monday morning, Ken Gray arrives in his office. He has two hours before the office opens to deal with the mountain of memos to be written, letters answered, decisions made.

He is Senator Hubert Humphrey's administrative assistant, the man who runs everything behind the scenes, the invisible hand that passes over the right speech at the right time, the invisible mouth that whispers reminders at crucial moments, the invisible brain that prepares a statement and a view on anything and everything. He may not do it all himself, but he is the man responsible for seeing that it is done. He must see that his man gets through every appointment on his schedule properly briefed, equipped with speeches, and dressed right. In the words of another administrative assistant, "You blow their nose, dust and diaper them, and send them out there."

Polly Toynbee is an editor of The Washington Monthly.

In Ken Gray's case, although he is in his mid-thirties, some 25 years younger than Humphrey, it's hard to see which of the two men is father and which is child. The roles seem to shift from one to the other. Some new senators hire old pros who know more about the system than they do and begin by being babied and tutored by their administrative assistants. But, although a man like Hubert Humphrey hasn't much to learn about politics, Ken advises him. Humphrey sometimes takes his advice.

These two men's lives are symbiotically intertwined. Without Ken and his staff, Humphrey is a big gun without a gunner, a knight in armor with no one to put him on his horse. And Ken, in turn, must depend on Humphrey. All the effort and the feeling of achievement to be had from the job is invested in the Senator and his ability to put it all to good use. If in some way the Senator fails, if he

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bungles something that's taken a lot of planning, if he changes his mind or gets something wrong, it's likely that Ken will not feel altogether forgiving. He has traded in all hope of personal recognition for the belief that he can achieve something through the Senator. But there is even more to it than that. In some way Ken has taken on, as part of his own identity, the glamor and sparkle of the Senator's image. He has, to some extent, merged, invested part of his own personality in that far stronger and more forceful public image of the man he serves. For this reason it is difficult to make him stand out and come alive as a man apart from the Senator.

Arriving at seven, to make up for not having worked on Saturday, Ken has two hours in which to clear the letters and memos on his desk. He sits down to his dictaphone and begins at the top of the heap. There must be well over 200 letters. These are the first few:

A questionnaire from an assistant university professor in Fresno, asking for a detailed account of Humphrey's presidential campaign expenses. An angry though polite letter from a Houston oil transporter complaining about Humphrey's statements on the fuel shortage. A letter from Minnesota reading, "Sir, All you thinks about your selfs. You ain't for common people or farmers. . . . I like old time better I don't care for new time. You can't see that people living on farms they want the old time better." An official letter from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers enclosing their latest statements with regard to Humphrey's position on the new Office of Technological Assessment. A thank-you letter reading "Dear Chief, I want to express my thanks for your assistance in helping my son Ian get into Brown University." An anxious but friendly letter from someone who claimed that during the campaign last May he had

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used his father's Texaco credit card to hire cars, on the assurance he would be paid back, and was now being sued for $298.68 which he couldn't pay himself. The Young People's Socialist League wants a quote for its new magazine, but attached to this letter was a note from another staffer reading, "Ken, I assume I should just ignore?" A Minnesotan complaining about the Democrats in the Minnesota legislature: "If the Democrats can't be constructive why don't they shut up?" A large number of letters applying for a job in the office, which get the universal reply, that they have excellent qualifications for working in the Senate but alas, there are no openings. The welfare director from Knoxville, Tennessee wants to recommend a young man he knows to become the head of the FBI, "since he's done so well as safety director of the city of Knoxville." The League of Women Voters of Minnesota wishes to introduce a new lady in Washington with whom the Senator's office should coordinate. Someone offers a little money towards Humphrey's presidential campaign deficit. A mimeographed questionnaire asks for Humphrey's views on heredity and intelligence. A letter thanks Humphrey for the tear sheet he sent her from the Congressional *Record*, which she encloses, "I now apply for the job of your secretary. You sure need one. Your remarks in the *Record* are sure a jumbled mess." Sure enough, the enclosed reprint is full of muddles and repeated paragraphs. Someone else writes to suggest a new FBI director: "A real good guy now working in the real estate business." Another thank-you letter saying, "Dear Hubey, I am really ashamed for my delay in saying THANKS for your time at our First District dance." Then another questionnaire from a kid in Moorhead, Minnesota who is writing a paper on "The Role of Administrative Assistants to U. S. Senators." And those are only the first few on the top of the heap.

By nine, the rest of the staff has arrived, 25 in all. Senator Humphrey's suite on the second floor of the Old Senate Office Building consists of four rooms with high ceilings and not enough floor space. (There is also an annex, a long way away, in a converted apartment building where three people do the first sorting of the mail.) The suite is on one of the many long marble corridors of the building. The great mahogany doors to the senatorial suites with their heavy senatorial seals look dark and forbidding. Not that they deter many chance tourists who, happening to be in Washington, take it as their constitutional right as taxpayers to call on their senator at any time of the day. Mostly these corridors are used by busy aides who hurry down them, their feet clack-clacking on the marble, like so many White Rabbits, looking at their watches and muttering over pieces of paper, passing the mail shafts where letters are continually puttering down from floors above.

Kathi Sezna, Ken's secretary, goes down to the carry-out in the basement as soon as she gets in, and fetches us each a cup of coffee. The telephone begins to ring. A mayor in Pennsylvania wants Humphrey to make a 25-second video-tape supporting him in an upcoming election. Dan Spiegel, the foreign affairs legislative assistant, comes in and says, a little indignantly, "I called you yesterday, you weren't there."

"Yesterday was Sunday. No, I wasn't in."

"I wanted to talk to you about Rhodesia," Dan says, and there is a brief discussion of a statement Dan will write for the Senator to insert into the *Record*. At least six members of the staff are expected to produce three or four statements apiece each week for the *Record*. These will not often be read on the floor, but they will appear in the Congressional *Record* as if they had been. Since the *Record* isn't many people's bedtime reading, I ask what the point of all that work was. Ken explains that

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

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there is no money put aside for printing, but senators are entitled to reprints of anything that has appeared in the *Record*, so that when someone writes asking for Humphrey's views on any subject, there will always be a copy of a statement on hand on almost any conceivable matter. "Also," he says, "the few thousand most important people in the country will read the *Record* now and then and it makes him appear active on every front." The Senator averages 20 such statements a week. "Another reason," Ken adds, "is that I love to think that in 10 years' time when people are doing research they will find that Hubert Humphrey was the first to put something in the *Record*." It still seemed to me a remarkable waste of time and effort.

It is now 9:30. During the course of a normal day Ken will not see the Senator very often. He hasn't yet spoken with Humphrey, although he is in an adjacent, though not adjoining, room. Their relationship is a controlled, rather than a natural, one. Ken feels that the less he has to see Humphrey, the more efficiently the office is running. There is not much natural empathy between these two men. Where Humphrey gives off an aura of hysterical energy, unable to keep still for a minute, quivering with an unnerving and unnatural bounce, Ken is slow, calm, deliberate, and thoughtful: but there is plenty of respect between them. Ken is a heavy man, dark, bespectacled, and dressed in large-size casual clothes. He moves slowly, appears unruffled, but can be sharp and authoritarian with members of his staff, although he doesn't lose his temper.

At this time Ken takes a tour around the different rooms of the office, partly to see that everyone is there, partly to show he is there, and partly to answer any questions. It is mostly a matter of routine.

Sitting in the room adjoining Humphrey's own office is the Senator's personal staff, his personal secretary, scheduling secretary, and his press officer, who also schedules Muriel, Mrs. Humphrey. These three women seem to act as an independent group within the office. Although technically they are answerable to him, there is a certain amount of tension between the women and Ken. They tend to go their own way without consulting him. Ken likes to see everything that goes onto and comes off Humphrey's desk, but members of the personal staff are sometimes possessive. They often give Humphrey advice that conflicts with Ken's, as will be seen in the bickering over the Senator's TV appearance.

When Ken comes back to his office after his rounds, the telephone rings. Humphrey is invited to appear on the *Today* show to talk about Watergate. Ken is enthusiastic, but Betty South, the press secretary, is not. Humphrey can't make up his mind. Senators Alan Cranston and Thomas Eagleton have accepted, Muskie is dithering, and McGovern has refused. "I think he has a duty to appear at a time like this," Ken says. "A duty to himself, and a duty to the country to let them know where he stands." Humphrey, it appears, is not so sure. Betty feels he should stay well clear. The matter remains unresolved until the end of the day. The question does in fact turn into something of a battle between Ken and Betty—a quiet, unstated battle of the wills.

Next, someone from McGovern's office comes in and asks Ken whether Humphrey can stand in for McGovern on the Nutrition Committee, as the Senator is away at the funeral of his maid. "What's the subject?" Ken asks. "Sugar in the diet, diabetes, and heart trouble," the young man answers. Ken says that if no one else can be found he'll see what he can arrange. There is no problem about the fact that Humphrey probably knows nothing about sugar in the diet, as the staff of the Nutrition Committee will provide a statement and a set of relevant questions for him to ask the witnesses who will be testifying.

The witness list for an important

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hearing tomorrow is handed to Ken. Tomorrow Humphrey plans a hearing on the gasoline shortage, which he is particularly interested in. Ken OKs the list and sends it in to the Senator. Ken OKs a letter for Humphrey to sign, a reply to a request by Senator Mike Gravel to co-sponsor a bill on the Airlines Mutual Aid Agreement, designed to stop airlines from receiving compensation when their employees strike, thereby destroying the incentive for airlines to resolve their disputes. Humphrey declines to put his name to this, saying the airline employees are "too highly paid already." However, there may have been more to Humphrey's decision than meets the eye. Northwest Airlines, noted for its protracted strikes and readiness to claim compensation even after one-man walkouts, has its head offices in Minneapolis, and it would not be unreasonable to suppose that the Senator numbers several of its executives among his political friends.

The issue of a Watergate statement keeps reappearing. More startling Watergate revelations break, and soon the Senator comes through to Ken again on the telephone. "Are you hesitant about making a statement on this business?" Ken says. "I hope you aren't." Ken suggests that Humphrey go down to the press gallery and make a statement. Humphrey agrees in principle.

No sooner has he put down the telephone than Hyman Bookbinder, an old Humphrey friend and adviser, is on the line urging Ken to persuade Humphrey to make a "ringing appeal for national unity so that government may continue to function," saying that if Nixon tells the truth, all will be forgiven, on the condition that he agrees to cooperate with Congress. Someone else calls up with the same idea, saying they had just bumped into Eric Sevareid, who also suggested the same course of action.

Ken is pleased to get this support for his own view on the matter.

A call comes in from a powerful man on a powerful senator's staff, asking Humphrey to speak for a minute to his daughter's sixth-grade class, which will be visiting the Capitol tomorrow. Ken says he'll try and tells the scheduling secretary to squeeze it in somehow. "I don't like that guy," he said, "but I guess it's good to have him owe us a favor or two."

Humphrey's position in the Senate doesn't allow for much wheeling and dealing and trading of favors. He has no seniority, no powerful committees. In the offices of more powerful men far more trading on a much deeper level takes up the time of the A.A.

At last it is lunch time. I am already exhausted from trying to keep up with the volume and variety of the morning's work.

We go down to the senators' dining room, where aides can eat when their senator isn't there. It wouldn't be described by many as one of the greatest privileges—regular canteen

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

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food and no liquor. It is the first time in the day that I have a chance to speak at any length with Ken. It is impossible to discuss his job, its frustrations and satisfactions, without discussing Humphrey himself in some detail.

"The trouble is that he still lives his life as a national candidate. He's been doing it for 20 years and it's very difficult to get a man to change. He used to be outspoken and very liberal, but as a national candidate he became less sharp. I guess that's been one disappointment in this job. But then, I really don't criticize him for becoming more moderate—that's the way the whole country's going. I really love Hubert Humphrey for having gone such a long, long way with good causes."

Ken began his career in politics as a legislative assistant to veteran liberal Senator Paul Douglas in 1961. His wife was hired as Humphrey's appointments secretary. In 1964 Ken became Humphrey's baggage man on his campaign plane, keeping track of everyone's luggage, "especially the reporters'." This also meant dealing with all the scheduling and travel plans on Humphrey's campaign. "He can be the most considerate man. Once, for no reason at all, he invited me, his baggage man, to attend some high-level campaign finance meetings in Florida." After the campaign Ken went back to Douglas' office, until the Senator was defeated, in 1966, and in 1967 he became a legislative assistant to Humphrey, then Vice President. "But I quit after three months. There wasn't any legislating to do. It was like being in limbo." Ken went from limbo to work for Maryland Senator Joseph Tydings who was defeated in 1970.

But it seemed that Humphrey didn't hold this defection against him, for in 1970 he begged Ken to come back as his administrative assistant. "Why did he choose me? I don't know. It was a choice between the Minnesota Mafia he had always been surrounded by or a whole host of other applicants who had their own private agenda for Humphrey. They came from labor unions or business interest groups. Yes, I was surprised. We'd never had a close relationship. We still haven't. I don't think either of us feel that much at ease together socially, although I do go and have dinner there once every three weeks or so."

Munching his way through a plate of tasteless chicken and watery vegetables, Ken explained how hard life was for Humphrey, and his staff, having no seniority, no committee chairmanship, only a couple of not very important subcommittees, with no right to any committee staff. When Humphrey returned to the Senate after leaving the Vice Presidency, he was forced to begin all over again as a freshman senator. Several kind senators had appealed to the power-that-be to give him back his seniority as far as possible, to put him back in the rank that he had left, but Senator Mike Mansfield put his foot down and sent him to the bottom of the class. "That means he'll be dead before he qualifies for an important chairmanship," Ken said.

Ken has had important disagreements with Humphrey on how to maximize his power. "The trouble was that Humphrey still had all the old ideas about the Senate. He didn't see how things had changed. When something happened he expected to be able to go down on the floor and talk about it with the other senators. He really loves the Senate. It used to be a place where you could politely interrupt and say what was on your mind. It was a freewheeling outfit. But [Majority Whip Robert] Byrd has a tight grip on the Senate now. It's firmly in his custodial care and everything is scheduled. In the beginning Humphrey used to come back from the floor shaking mad. He used to say with terrible indignation, 'I went over there and wanted to talk, and I couldn't!' "

The important decision that Ken has never forgiven Humphrey for

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making was abandoning his place on the Government Operations Committee in exchange for a place on Foreign Relations. Ken had strongly advised him against it, pointing out that very shortly the Senator would get an important subcommittee on Government Operations, but that he'd probably never get one on Foreign Relations. But Byrd had offered him the Foreign Relations job as a special favor, and Humphrey remembered the good old times he had had on that committee. Now he regrets it terribly. Ken feels bitter, but tries not to remind the Senator of this mistake. "If he'd stayed he'd have had the subcommittee on impoundment, a thing close to his heart. He wishes now that he'd listened to me."

Ken estimates that Humphrey would be listed as one of the 25 most important senators, but not as one of the top 10. "He has many friends, and he gets listened to. There is a chance he might become the Senate majority leader, as people are anxious not to have Byrd—just a chance." Humphrey's advancement is the only way that Ken himself can move on. He has come to the top of the ladder as an administrative assistant and would have nowhere to go, except to the office of a more powerful man.

In the Senate there are basically two types of administrative assistants. Some are old friends and colleagues who worked with their bosses long before they reached the Senate, coming from their home states and acting as emotional as well as official props to their man. They would never consider working for anyone else. Others, like Ken Gray, are professional aides who work their way through several senatorial offices in the course of their careers, soldiers of fortune who move freely from one senator to another, always hoping to move up the ladder in terms of working for more and more powerful men. Many of these aides tend to spend a good deal of time politicking for themselves, trying to do favors for the offices of great men for whom they aspire to work, building up personal contacts with people who will help them get on in the world. It seems likely that Ken will decide to move on at some point. He is by nature far more issue-oriented than many A.A.s, but almost none of Humphrey's bills get passed, and what goes on in Humphrey's minor subcommittees could not be described as being of much importance. Also, rather to Ken's disapproval, Humphrey is determined to involve himself in every conceivable subject, and not to specialize. Although Humphrey has an enormous ability to absorb facts, Ken feels he really shouldn't spread himself so thin.

It is more than time now to hurry back to the office.

Waiting for Ken is a little pile of telephone messages. Ken's secretary has her lunch at her desk. Humphrey is asked to chair the Foreign Relations Committee on May 10, so Ken calls back and agrees with some alacrity. Someone from the Canal Zone has a query about voting rights. John Ehrlichman has, not surprisingly, canceled his debate with Humphrey at the Brookings Institution, will a substitute do? There is a bit more politicking to be done to get a Humphrey friend onto the Democratic Party's Vice Presidential Selection Commission. The Commission seems to be getting ridiculously huge. Will Humphrey co-host a conference on "Saving the Cities"? The answer is no, he won't have time. Ken calls back a Baltimore potentate ("I don't like that guy") and laughs and jokes with him for a minute or two. He has developed a habit common to most people who are used to working in crowded offices of making his end of the conversation completely discreet and incomprehensible. He glances through copies of letters Humphrey himself has just sent out, one to "Dear Willy," of Germany, another to Lady Bird, saying he is thinking of her in Washington in the spring now that all her daffodils are in bloom. An aide

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rushes in and asks could he put through a priority call to Teheran for a friend who needs to find her husband urgently.

The press secretary comes in, still worrying over Humphrey's Watergate position. "I've polled the office, and the majority are against his appearing on the *Today* show tomorrow morning." Ken nods and lets the matter drop for the time being. He intends to persuade Humphrey to do it.

Kathi has hurriedly finished her club sandwich and is licking her fingers. Above her is a notice board filled with pictures of the Senator, a poster saying "Little People for Humphrey" showing him with some children, a picture of him bottle-feeding a lion cub, a picture of him looking sporty in a felt hat. On the mantlepiece is a sign saying "THINK MINNESOTA."

It is time to rush over to the Senate floor to give Humphrey a statement to insert into the *Record*. As we reach the senators' subway to catch a train over to the Senate, another train pulls in with Humphrey sitting in the front, as if he were driving the thing, also looking agitated at having to sit still doing nothing for a few moments. Ken hands him the document and Humphrey promises to squeeze it in later. They then set off at a racing speed down the corridors, Ken managing to keep up most of the time, Humphrey talking very fast and loud, myself having difficulty staying with them without breaking into a run.

I could list another 2,000 things that came across Ken's desk that afternoon. He doesn't see the Senator again, as Humphrey is in an agricultural committee hearing, but he does manage to persuade him to accept the *Today* show invitation, and he feels very pleased about that.

We leave the office at six and go down to the parking lot. One of the biggest privileges of being a senator or an A.A. turns out to be the right to a parking space of your own. For all the other thousands of Hill employees, the scramble in the mornings to find a place to park is one of the main topics of conversation. We drive off to the Washington Hilton, where the Minnesota Chamber of Commerce, wives in evening dress, was holding a reception. The *pièce de résistance* was a gigantic ice flower vase full of real flowers.

Ken hates receptions and tries hard to melt into a corner, but he tends to be sought out. Everyone has a large lapel label which helps with the identification problem, as long as you don't appear to be looking at it. A man from Northwestern Bell, a Minnesota journalist, a Chamber of Commerce official, all hurry to greet him. This is a big, freeloading, holiday occasion, and everyone is out to enjoy himself. The canapes are vanishing and there is a fair bit of back-slapping and joking about wives, most of whom are present. Then there is a bustle at the door, a flash of a few instamatic cameras, and Humphrey bounds into the room, hand outstretched to anyone who wants it. This is not an occasion where Ken is expected to stand behind his boss, discreetly reminding him who everyone is. Humphrey probably knows more people in the room than anyone else. It isn't often that Ken can be of much assistance to him in that way. Humphrey just knows and remembers every hand he's ever had the pleasure to pump.

By 7:45 Ken can slip away and go home, but it isn't the end of his official day. He and his wife are dining with the people from Northwestern Bell.

Next morning, 8:30 a.m., Ken arrives, not in the best of moods, but his moods don't show, unless you ask him how he feels. After Ken had left the office for the reception last night, the Senator had been gotten to by his press secretary, and had been persuaded to cancel the *Today* show. Instead, he went to a Minnesota Grain Terminal Association breakfast. Ken is not pleased. But nothing more is said about it. That round was one up for

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the personal staff.

At nine, the phone rings, and Ken says, "Yes, sir," as if he had no quarrel with his boss. The Senator is calling him into his office, together with a legislative assistant, to go over a speech to be made tomorrow on federalism at the Woodrow Wilson Center. "It's totally unnecessary for me to work on the speech," Ken says, "but Humphrey likes an audience." He returns shortly, having insisted that he was not really needed. The phone rings. A man in Albuquerque asks why Humphrey isn't shouting about Watergate. Ken explains quietly that the Senator doesn't want to make too much of a partisan thing out of it. He could have jumped all over the President, but like other Democrats, he was holding back for fear of damaging the country. You would think Ken agreed with Humphrey's non-position from hearing him talk. That's the kind of restraint needed in that job.

More letters come off Humphrey's desk, already signed, saying things like, "It's always a pleasure to be with my friends the meatcutters." An old lady of 95 in a Minnesota nursing home gets a letter saying, "How grateful you must be for all the blessings that have been yours during these many years. May the days ahead bring you even greater joy." and "Dear Sister Hubertene, Thank you for remembering Mrs. Humphrey and me with your Easter greeting. We spent this meaningful time of the year with our family." He also promises to support any legislation that might come up against the slaughter of porpoises.

At 10:00 a call comes through saying that the Senate lacks three for a quorum. Ken promises to deliver Humphrey right away, but as he puts the phone down he says there is no rush, and he will wait until they've found the other two senators before sending Humphrey over.

At 10:30 Ken calls the weekly press and scheduling conference. When the Senator is out, his office is

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used for meetings. The whole staff, apart from clerical workers, gathers, and Ken addresses them quite sternly. Some of them, notably the press secretary and the Senator's personal secretary and scheduling secretary think these meetings are a waste of time. Probably this is only because they are constantly striving to wriggle out from under Ken's grip and make themselves into a separate group answerable only to the Senator. The rift seems to be quite deep, and apparently is quite common in many Senate offices.

The press secretary is not particularly pleased to see me in the meeting, possibly only because she had not been consulted in the first place about my visit to the office. "Well," she said, laughing a little edgily, "So Ken's going to be a celebrity, ha, ha!"

Everyone is sitting around in a circle of chairs, no one daring to sit behind the boss's huge desk. They all are a little hushed, awed in this large, carpeted room which reeks of the aura of power. Big portraits on the wall of Johnson and Truman, none of Kennedy. A primitive painting of a farm above the mantle piece, presumably something to do with Minnesota, a great vice presidential seal and a senatorial seal behind his chair, an elegant cut-glass jar full of peanuts on a coffee table. One of the less reverent women insists on eating some in spite of Ken's warning that it's against the rules.

"So what about Watergate?" Ken starts off.

"Just that piece on the op-ed page of *The Minneapolis Tribune* that may get printed in *The Washington Post*. That's all we feel necessary at the moment," the press secretary says quickly.

"Have we got anything on the Arts and Humanities Bill coming up today?" Ken asks.

"We have a statement for him and a memo on two amendments," says Al Saunders, the chief legislative assistant.

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The scheduling secretary is then called upon to read out what the Senator is already committed to for the next week in the way of speaking engagements outside all the Senate work. There are 12 speeches, ranging from Temple Israel to the 7th District PTA, and a file on each is ready to be distributed for people to work on.

Then there is the most exciting event of the week, Humphrey's hearings this afternoon on the gasoline shortage. "It's a fun hearing and a fun issue," Ken says, licking his lips. "He'll probably want to make a short speech putting some of the material in the *Record*. Are there any important Minnesota press men coming? We've really done well getting in first with these hearings."

In fact, the effort to get the gas hearings in before anyone else is an extraordinary waste of time. During the next few weeks there are at least five different sets of hearings scheduled on exactly this issue, each arranged by a different senator. The chief government spokesman on the matter is due to testify at each, presumably giving the same evidence five times over, for no better reason than that this is a politically sensitive issue, much in the public mind, and a number of senators want to be noticed for "doing something" about the situation.

There are at this meeting two new Congressional Fellows who had arrived this week to join the staff for four months. They are on loan from different branches of the government; the idea is that their experience on a senator's staff will help them deal more smoothly with Congress when they return to their regular jobs. They are treated exactly as if they are new legislative assistants.

Ken proceeds to brief the two newcomers, and most of the others drift back to their own offices, Humphrey's personal staff hurrying out with almost indecent haste.

"If you get a specific memo from the Senator asking you to do something, you must let *me* know. Every so often he misdirects his memos, and I'll see that the work gets done by the right person. He believes in what's best described as controlled chaos. Sometimes he does it by mistake, sometimes because he thinks it's good to keep the office on its toes."

Ken then inquires what particularly interests the two. Wendy says she is interested in problems of the elderly. Tim says education. Ken then tells Wendy that since the Senator has already put her on the gasoline shortage and the energy crisis, she'd better stay with it. She doesn't look altogether delighted. "Nutrition? Does that interest you?" Neither of them answered, but Ken gives it to Wendy, presumably because it sounds like the sort of thing a woman ought to be interested in. Tim is given a range of topics to study: the interior, land-use, and strip mining, most of public works, national growth and development, commerce, transportation, judiciary, consumer affairs, and District of Columbia affairs. Wendy is told that a third of her time will probably be taken up by energy. Her other responsibilities will be the judiciary, law enforcement, antitrust, the Post Office, the Civil Service, consumer economics, as well as nutrition and the elderly.

They are both aghast, though Wendy is the braver in expressing her horror at the amount of work. "But that's ridiculous! Are we trying to run a mini-government in this office or something?" she says, trying to make it sound as if she is half joking. "I mean, do just the few of us in this office have to cover the *entire* government?"

Ken explains that Humphrey "likes to have a policy on everything, and he likes to understand everything that's going on in the Senate."

When you imagine this much work being duplicated a hundred times, in each senator's office, when you consider that every senator feels he must have a policy somewhere on record on everything from porpoise hunting to

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strip mining, from sugar in the diet to arts and humanities, the whole Senate suddenly appears to be a kind of madhouse of hurried statements, spurious opinionating, and pointless duplication. This particular office is probably worse in this respect than most, first because Humphrey has no committee staff to take the weight off the shoulders of his staff on the things that are most important to him, and second, because Humphrey still acts like a presidential candidate out on the road, required to answer well every question from every stray heckler. He doesn't like to feel that anything is passing him by.

Most senators seem to have this feeling to some extent. In many cases it is probably disastrously bad for their effectiveness as knowledgeable and serious men. However, it's only fair to point out that a number of senators do try to specialize and thoroughly learn about the issues that interest them most. Among senators who like, trust, and on the whole agree with one another, is is common for them to defer to the senator who specializes in a certain subject and trust his opinion on how to vote. This helps reduce the amount of work and lets the senators learn about some things in depth.

Ken continues to instruct the newcomers. "I feel like a new member of the House being loaded with committees I don't want," Wendy says. "So what does all this really mean?"

Ken took a deep breath, "Well," he said slowly, "on a day-to-day basis it means the receptionist knows who to channel calls to when we get inquiries on a particular subject. We try to satisfy all callers who aren't crazy repeaters. We treat them with courtesy. We make almost no distinction between Minnesotans and non-Minnesotans. You don't *have* to see all the people who turn up and ask for you. You aren't totally vulnerable to chance visitors. If they're not from Minnesota you can give them the reprint of a speech and tell them to go away. If they are from Minnesota, you can get them to make an appointment to come back and see you when you aren't so busy.

"The Senator doesn't care all that much about his committees. Otherwise, he particularly likes amendments, if you want to propose some. One of his maxims is, 'Some of our best legislation is non-germane.' He doesn't like to testify before anyone else's committee, he thinks it's a waste of time."

Cleaning out the ashtrays that had been used in the meeting, and putting the chairs in the Senator's office back in position, Ken says to me, when the others have gone, "You know, I used to have a slogan on my desk which said, 'If you can keep your head while all about are losing theirs then you don't fully understand the situation.' " He explains that he had meant to hand out the week's speech files at the meeting, but "everyone was moaning and groaning so much that I thought it would be better to let it wait."

As we come out into the corridor, a loud crescendo of singing voices crashes around our ears. It turns out that senators take turns inviting choirs from their home state to sing in the rotunda at the end of the passageway; all right for those with offices on the other side of the building, not so good for those in easy earshot. Back in the office, someone calls up to ask what the President's decision to increase cheese imports means. The Martin Agronsky show calls, and Ken tells the press secretary that there just isn't room on the schedule today. "Anyway, we don't owe him a thing. Last time he was on that show Agronsky was as rotten as can be, gave him a really bad time." The phone rings again, "Yes, Senator? Uhuh. Uhuh. Right." He turns to me and says, "The Senator is grabbing a bowl of soup in the Senate dining room. We'll go over there and take him to his 1:30 gas hearings."

No time for lunch. We go over to the Senate. Wendy comes too, since she is dealing with gas. As we arrive,

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Humphrey comes bolting out of the dining room chewing deliberately on an indigestion tablet. We are all just about to set off when the phone beside us rings. It is Max Kampelman, a Washington attorney and longtime Humphrey adviser. He has something urgent to say. It is getting very close to time for the hearing and Ken is fidgeting a little with the file he is waiting to hand the Senator. "I swear to God I haven't seen her for a month," Humphrey is saying down the telephone. He always talks as loud as if he were addressing a room full of deaf people. He puts down the telephone and dives toward the corridor, all of us following as best we can. He waves to some beaming nuns and calls out "Hi." A woman with an instamatic camera leaps out at him from behind a pillar, boldly introducing herself. Humphrey grins at her, shakes her hand, and says how very glad he is to see her. Ken and Wendy stand well back from this encounter. Humphrey suddenly stops seeming as if he's in a hurry. The woman produces her aunt, her husband, and her child from behind the same pillar and takes their photograph talking with him. Humphrey suggests that the aunt hold the camera and take another photo with the woman in the picture. Then he waves to them and moves on, having patted the baby. He dashes on around the corner and again we follow. Someone grabs his jacket as he passes and he waves again. A number of people call out "Hi, Senator." It's as if he were Santa Claus in a big department store, paid to be nice. But Ken says he enjoys this more than anything, cares little for privacy, and feels himself regenerated by every hand he shakes.

Arriving at the committee room, he sits down, shaking hands with the other people there, and right away launches into the statement Ken has just handed him, which he hasn't seen before. We stay for a little while to hear him. Having already read the statement, I recognize when it comes to an end and he continues to speak extempore on fuel shortage, with particular reference to Minnesota. He has no brief with him that tells him these things, but he does seem to know exactly how many independent gas stations have just closed down, exactly how many men are out of work, exactly which firms in the state own how many stations. Ken doesn't know where all this information came from, "Probably someone he talked to last night at that Chamber of Commerce reception."

Then, at 3:30, a call comes from the front office: did Ken remember that Humphrey had an appointment with an important contributor, to discuss a conference he was holding that the Senator had promised to attend? Ken groans, very silently. This man has been in Washington three times before and they had been unable to fit him in. And he is important. He says that in 10 minutes he will take him over to the gas hearings and hopes that they end soon.

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Then we walk all the way back to the hearing room with the important contributor. Humphrey is not halfway through yet, and is still interrogating the first witnesses. He is clearly in full flight and not interruptible. So we stand outside in the corridor while the man explains to Ken exactly what he wants to say to the Senator, and then asks if Ken will guide him to Wilbur Mills at the Ways and Means Committee. Weaving and wending our way through the passages and corridors, we hurry along, Ken having got used to Humphrey's walking pace, until we reach the great double doors of the Ways and Means palace. The man, knocking on the door rather nervously, looks not unlike Dorothy knocking on the door of the Wizard of Oz's audience chamber. The door opened a crack, and inside you could just catch a glimpse of the room, darkened by heavy yellow drapes across the window. He went in and the door closed again at once.

By the time we get back to the office and Ken has dealt with a few more phone calls, it is 4:30. The Senator has to catch a plane to a Freemasons' dinner in New York at 5:30. There are still statements to be inserted into the *Record* before he goes. Also, he must change into a dinner jacket and get to the airport. "Well, it won't be the first time he misses a plane," Ken says, as we make the long journey back to the hearings. We wait 10 minutes while Humphrey winds up. He comes hurrying out, glances at the statements as he pounds along, and disappears into a "Senators Only" room with them in his hand. While he is gone, Ken goes to find his driver, who works during the days as a doorman outside the public gallery of the Senate. That is a patronage job, of which each Senator is entitled three. Unfortunately, the driver has gone to repark the car and won't be back for 10 minutes. Humphrey has to fit in time for coffee with Willy Brandt and some other Senators before he goes, and he now hurries off to that function.

Ken goes back to the office, the day almost over. He gets away at 6:00, more easily done when the Senator is away. I still have to ask him about the real satisfactions of his job.

He says, "You don't understand the fascination of power, of being near where it all happens, of making history yourself, of making things happen. I wouldn't be in any other business. There's scarcely a day when I don't leave the office feeling that I have really achieved something that day, feeling I have really done something important."

But what is really being achieved out of that great mountain of trivia? Very few of Humphrey's bills ever get passed. Not many people read his statements in the *Record*. It isn't clear that the world is being made any better by the work in that office. The most important task that Humphrey has to perform is voting, and his time would be spent more profitably in reading and being briefed thoroughly on current legislation. For senators with more seniority and powerful committees, their most important work is done in the hearing room, where there is a large complement of extra staff to help them get some kind of grasp on what's going on. For a man like Humphrey, whose power is confined to his vote, devoting so much time to holding competitive, repetitive hearings and generating opinions on so many subjects isn't productive.

If all that great amount of work done in the office, if all the time all the energy of Humphrey and his men were channeled into something else, they could, among them, produce a daily newspaper, put on a big Broadway show every week, or probably govern a country the size of England. They are like a group of men on bicycling machines in a slimming salon, using maximum effort for minimum mileage. Worthy, noble, well-intentioned effort for the most part, but spun out so thin that the end result is scarcely visible to the human eye. ■

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political book notes

Public affairs books to be published in June.

American Defense Policy. Richard G. Head, Ervin J. Rokke, eds. Johns Hopkins, $17.50/$6.50. If you tend to look down on the intellectual standards of the service academies, you'll be surprised by this admirable collection of essays edited by two Air Force Academy professors.

American Defense Policy Since 1945: A Preliminary Bibliography. Geoffrey Kemp, Clark Murdock, Frank L. Simonie, eds. University of Kansas, $4.95.

American Populism. George McKenna. Putnam, $6.95.

The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. Russell F. Weigley. Macmillan, $12.95. A thoughtful exploration of the history of American military strategy, tracing the tendency to seek the total annihilation of the enemy back to the Civil War.

The Americans, The Democratic Experience. Daniel J. Boorstin. Random House, $10. Never one to overstress abstractions or ideas, Boorstin gives us a 700-page version of modern America containing nothing more theoretical than a Xerox machine. Most of his effort goes into showing the "democratizing" influence of department stores, life insurance, newspapers, and advertising. Nietzsche once dismissed this definition of democracy as "the penchant for counting noses."

At the Red Summit: Interpreter Behind the Iron Curtain. Erwin Weit. Macmillan, $6.95.

Black Business in the New South: A Social History of the North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company. Walter B. Weare. University of Illinois, $10.95.

Body Count. William Turner Huggett. Putnam, $7.95.

The Charity of Nations. David Wall. Basic. Of the dozens of books on economic development now being published, this is one of the better surveys. While Wall does not delve far enough for answers, he at least asks the difficult question, whether international organizations are any more effective as aid-givers than AID.

City Police. Jonathan Rubinstein. Farrar, Straus & Giroux, $10.

The Computer Survival Handbook: How to Talk Back to Your Computer. Susan W. Wooldridge, Keith London. Gambit, $6.95.

Confessions of a Corporate Headhunter. Allan J. Cox. Trident, $6.95. These rambling observations about the business world by an executive recruiter bear about as much resemblance to confessions as President Nixon's comments about his role in the Watergate break-in. Cox's comments are occasionally well-intentioned, sometimes Machiavellian, but generally they convey the less-than-startling impression that the executive suite is a rather dreary place.

Congress and the Budget. William Proxmire, Paul W. McCracken, John W. Byrnes, Charles Schultze, Al Ullman. American Enterprise Institute, $2.50.



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Contrabandista! Evert Clark, Nicholas Horrock. Praeger, $6.95. A well-written story of the world-wide heroin traffic and the government's oft-thwarted efforts to stop it. While the authors give us gripping descriptions of the battles between bandits and narcs, they neglect to explain the equally passionate struggles that often take place between the various members of the anti-drug team—especially between Customs agents and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. The book's sense of verisimilitude suffers when the authors show us a BNDD man tripping over a Customs agent and a cop, and imply that this is "coordination."

The DDT Myth: Triumph of the Amateurs. Rita Gray Beatty. Intext, $6.95. Given the tone of some of the early ecology books, it is only fair to forgive authors like Beatty some of their stridency in arguing to opposite case. The book's two points are that environmentalists are not as erudite as they should be, and that DDT and other ecological evils have done some good. One can concede those points without buying the conclusion that ecologists are a national peril.

Departing Glory: Theodore Roosevelt as Ex-President. Joseph L. Gardner. Scribner's, $12.50.

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The Presidential Character

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Presents a unique analysis of the rationale behind the actions of our Presidents from Taft to Nixon. In researching, the author found a correlation between personality type and White House performance. His approach is much based on the psychology of adaptation—ways interpersonal experience shapes a person's self-image, world view, political style, and subsequent interpersonal experiences. *1973, 479pp., paper (013-6978-62-2) $5.95*

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A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United States. Herbert Aptheker, ed. Citadel, $17.50. This second volume by the Marxist historian includes various editorials and essays, from the moderate Tuskegee faction to the militant Du Bois, as well as personal recollections of black farmers and ministers in the days before the New Deal.

Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States. James L. Sundquist. Brookings, $8.95/$3.95. A distinguished scholar analyzes past realignments of the parties—emphasizing those of the 1850s, 1890s, and 1930s. He predicts that in the short run, at least, "the headlong march toward decomposition [of the two-party system] will be checked and even reversed, the New Deal party system will be reinvigorated, and most of those who ceased identifying with one or the other major party in the recent turmoil will re-identify." However the author's use of the labels "activist" and "conservative" to distinguish between the tendencies of the two parties seems inadequate to deal with Nixon coalition, which does favor "activism" when it's in behalf of big business and big labor.

The Economic Consequences of Reduced Military Spending. Bernard Udis. Lexington. While the economic analyses collected here provide welcome support for the idea that national prosperity and big Defense budgets are not inextricably linked, the book suffers terribly from an easily avoidable flaw. Most of the pieces were written three years ago and have since undergone only minimal updating. This leaves one article arguing that the draft should be ended, another predicting the military budget for Fiscal Year 1972, and others hypothesizing about the signing of the SALT agreements or the end of the Vietnam war. The book's more perceptive and timeless pieces are rewarding, but it would be nice if academics didn't always assume that they can get away with this sort of caper.

The Failure of Success: Ecological Values vs. Economic Myths. Robert Theobald, Stephanie Mills, eds. Bobbs-Merrill, $7.95/$3.95.

Father Coughlin: The Tumultuous Life of the Priest of the Little Flower. Sheldon Marcus. Little, Brown, $8.95. Adequate though unimaginative biography of the flamboyant father of modern demagoguery, who beat FDR and Goebbels in discovering the radio broadcast route to the mass audience. Money and moral evangelism were intertwined, as Coughlin himself explained in 1932, "If I didn't believe in religion and a happy beyond, I would get everything for myself that I could lay my hands on in this world."

For Reasons of State. Noam Chomsky. Pantheon, $12.95/$3.45.

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The Fourth Year of the Nixon Watch. John Osborne. Liveright, $6.95. Instant history of the sort represented by this collection of *New Republic* columns is always a gamble; readers can flip to the late-July articles and find that—oh, ho!—Osborne, too, was fooled by the Watergate. That so many of Osborne's judgments do stand up is a large tribute, and it adds weight to some of his earlier perceptions which have now taken on added significance: "Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Colson [are] the three Nixon assistants most involved in seeing to it that campaign attitudes and tactics are shaped up in the way the President wants them shaped" (August 5, 1972).

The Future While It Happened. Samuel Lubell. Norton, $5.95. Some discouraging findings about the nature of the coalition that elected Richard Nixon in 1972. They want cost-plus contracts for themselves and nothing for anyone else.

Grow or Die. George T. Lock Land. Random House, $10.

The Idea of Fraternity in America. Wilson Carey McWilliams. University of California, $14.95.

Intelsat: Policy Maker's Dilemma. Judith Tegger Kildow. Lexington. Thesis-like examination of what happened when COMSAT went international. For specialists only.

Justice in the Round: The Trial of Angela Davis. Reginald Major. Third Press, $6.95.

The Kennedy Case. Rita Dallas, Jean Ratcliffe. Putnam, $6.95.

Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind. Stephen R. Graubard. Norton, $7.95. A rather pedantic summary of Kissinger's writings on foreign policy prior to 1969 by a close friend. Graubard finds some interesting foreshadowing of the Nixon Administration's foreign policy in sources like Kissinger's 1954 Harvard doctoral thesis.

Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics. Heinz Eulau, Kenneth Prewitt. Bobbs-Merrill, $15.

Lions in the Street: The Inside Story of the Great Wall Street Law Firms. Paul Hoffman. Saturday Review, $8.95. An adapted excerpt appears in this issue of *The Washington Monthly*.

Manscapes: An American Journey. Colin Henfrey. Gambit, $7.95.

A Minority of Members: Women in the U. S. Congress. Hope Chamberlain. Praeger, $10. A collection of 80 self-congratulatory, postage-stamp-sized monographs on past congresswomen, reinforcing the suspicion that the stiffest hurdles to accepting social movements are sometimes the books they bring in their wake.

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The New Journalism. Tom Wolfe. Harper & Row, $10.95.

The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR. Ralph Bunche. University of Chicago, $17.50.

Power Play. Leonard Mosley. Random House, $10. The luck of the publisher's timetable has enabled Mosley to hit the book stores just as gasoline pumps are going dry and the Saudi Arabian oil minister is announcing that he may cut off all shipments to the U. S. if we don't do something about Israel. The book's mass of anecdotes and breezy approach to questions of politics and economics ("there was something about the convulsiveness of the gesture which suggested that the cup Ahmed Yamani was shaking was an obstinate American oilman") will frustrate those hoping for serious analysis. Still the reading is painless and conveys the impression that the new Arab rich men are not that different from J. Paul Getty and H. L. Hunt.

The Preachers. James Morris. St. Martin's, $8.95.

The Presidency in Flux. George Reedy. Columbia, $5.95. The three lectures given at Columbia in the fall of 1971 are somewhat dated—especially Reedy's responses to student questions—and occasionally even banal. Nonetheless, Reedy, one of our best observers of the presidency, still has some interesting things to say.

Psychological Survival. Stanley Cohen, Laurie Taylor. Pantheon, $6.95.

Ralph McGill, Reporter. Harold H. Martin. Atlantic-Little, Brown, $10.95.

Ride Free, Drive Free: The Transit Fund and the Robin Hood Principle. W. H. O'Connell. John Day, $7.95. It's bad enough that the U. S. has nearly as many cars as adults; worse that they all hit the roads at the same time each day. Assuming that our addiction to the automobile is pathological, the author recommends a mass transit system with dummy steering wheels and gas gauges at each seat.

Right From the Start. Gary Warren Hart. Quadrangle, $7.95.

Sections 235 and 236, An Economic Evaluation of HUD's Principal Housing Subsidy Programs. Harrison Wehner. American Enterprise Institue, $3.

U. S. Trade Policy and Agricultural Imports. Iowa State University Center for Agricultural and Rural Development. Iowa State, $8.95.

The Unreal Estate. Anthony Wolff, Scribner's, $5.95.

Urban Public Education in America: Problems and Prospects. Raymond C. Hummel, John M. Nagle. Oxford, $9.50/$3.95.

World Food Production, Demand, and Trade. Leroy L. Blakeslee, Earl O. Heady, Charles F. Framingham. Iowa State, $12.

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

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

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Senators Stennis and Fulbright agree that the Constitution grants Congress substantial powers in the area of foreign policy. They disagree over whether Congress has exercised these powers effectively in recent decades.

Civil Disobedience: Aid or Hindrance to Justice?

with William Sloane Coffin Jr. and Morris I. Leibman
The Rev. Dr. Coffin, Chaplain of Yale University, contends that civil disobedience throughout the centuries has greatly aided justice. Mr. Leibman, a prominent attorney, is less enthusiastic. He argues that the American system provides the apparatus to further justice without reverting to violence and civil disobedience.

Social Security: Universal or Selective?

with Milton Friedman and Wilbur J. Cohen
Mr. Cohen, former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, and economist Milton Friedman choose to disagree in a highly informative and entertaining debate. Mr. Friedman wants to phase out social security and replace its welfare features with a negative income tax. Mr. Cohen takes vigorous exception.

Each debate is available in its own hardback book for $7.50 and on its own tape cassette for $3.00

Can Regulatory Agencies Protect the Consumer?

with Manuel F. Cohen and George J. Stigler
Mr. Stigler, of the "Chicago School" of economists, and Manuel F. Cohen, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, agree that competition protects the consumer but disagree over the best way to achieve and guarantee it.

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